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Case No. 1: Business partners A, B, and C consult a lawyer when
A is subpoenaed to a federal grand jury. The three fear that the investi-
gation could come to focus on them all. After the lawyer appears with
A, the Government subpoenas the lawyer to discover who else consulted
her.'
Case No. 2: To show the financial resources of a defendant in a
prosecution for an alleged tax offense, the government subpoenas the
defense lawyer to testify concerning the legal fee paid.2
Case No. 3: A defendant's affidavit in support of a motion to sup-
press is contradicted by a government witness. While the case is still
pending, the defense lawyer is subpoenaed to a grand jury investigating
her client's alleged perjury to testify about all of her conversations with
her client regarding the affidavit.3
Case No. 4: The lawyer for the target of a grand jury investiga-
tion monitors the witnesses appearing before the grand jury and in-
forms her client about what she learns. After indicting the client for the
substantive offense, but before trial, the grand jury opens an investiga-
tion into whether the client obstructed justice and subpoenas the lawyer
to uncover what she told her client about the investigation.4
In none of these cases did the lawyer commit any wrongdoing.
Moreover, in each, the lawyer had a well-recognized ethical duty to
preserve the confidentiality of the information sought by the govern-
1 See, e.g., United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(government sought to call attorney representing multiple clients during grand jury
investigation as a witness at trial to prove existence of criminal enterprise); see also
infra notes 56-65 and accompanying text (discussing client identity and fee informa-
tion); infra note 19 (discussing Department of Justice attorney subpoena statistics).
2 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 63-
64 (2d Cir. 1984) (granting government's request for disclosure by attorney of client
identity and fee information so that government could use the information "as evidence
of unexplained wealth which may have been derived from criminal activity . . .and as
evidence of the violation of the tax laws").
3 See United States v. Morales-Martinez, 672 F. Supp. 762, 764 (D. Vt. 1987).
After the lawyer submitted what the government later alleged was a fraudulent pass-
port on behalf of the client at a bail hearing, see id. at 763, the attorney was subpoe-
naed to the grand jury to testify about "the content of your discussion with your client
before you proffered the passport to the magistrate." Id. at 764. The court held that the
information was covered by the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege.
See id. at 765-66; see also infra notes 54-55 & 66-75 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing crime/fraud exception).
4 See In re Grand Jury Testimony of Attorney X, 621 F. Supp. 590, 592-94
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that information relayed by attorney merely as "conduit" to
client regarding grand jury investigation was not covered by attorney-client privilege,
not covered by work-product privilege because they were not a result of an attorney's
thought processes or mental impressions and because the government made requisite
showing of need).
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ment.5 According to theories advanced by government lawyers in recent
years, however, the client information in these cases is not privileged.
Indeed, under current Justice Department policy, the lawyer may be
subpoenaed, compelled to testify, and, in all probability, forced to with-
draw from the case.'
A. The Attorney Subpoena': A "New Investigative Tool"
Until very recently, the notion of subpoenaing a lawyer to testify
about a client, in the very matter in which the lawyer was serving as
advocate, was almost unthinkable. By long-standing tradition, as well
as ethical rule, a lawyer is discouraged or prohibited from acting as
advocate and witness in the same case,8 especially if the lawyer's testi-
mony is harmful to the client.' Thus, when the Supreme Court formu-
lated the lawyer's work-product privilege in Hickman v. Taylor,"0 the
possibility that discovery of work product could lead to the lawyer's
testimony was thought to be a powerful reason to deny discovery in the
first place."
5 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1980).
6 See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1986) (government
filed motion to disqualify attorneys because it intended to call them as witnesses);
United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (government
sought to disqualify attorney and offered as one ground its intention to call him as a
witness).:
7 As used in this Article, the term "attorney subpoena" means a grand jury or
other subpoena issued to an attorney for the purpose of eliciting evidence about the
attorney's client.
8 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(B), DR 5-102
(1980); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7 (1987).
1 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1980).
10 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
" See id. at 513. In discussing the reasons against "forcing an attorney to repeat
or write out all that witnesses have told him and to deliver the account to his adver-
sary," id. at 512-13, Justice Murphy stated:
No legitimate purpose is served by such production. The practice forces
the attorney to testify as to what he remembers or what he saw fit to write
down regarding witnesses' remarks. Such testimony could not qualify as
evidence; and to use it for impeachment or corroborative purposes would
make the attorney much less an officer of the court and much more an
ordinary witness. The standards of the profession would thereby suffer.
Id. at 513. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson stated:
Every lawyer dislikes to take the witness stand and will do so only for
grave reasons. This is partly because it is not his role; he is almost invari-
ably a poor witness. But he steps out of professional character to do it. He
regrets it; the profession discourages it. But the practice advocated here is
one which would force him to be a witness, not as to what he has seen or
done but as to other witnesses' stories, and not because he wants to do so
but in self defense.
[Vol. 136:1783
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In the criminal context, prior to 1980, federal prosecutors gener-
ally believed that lawyers were not potential sources of information in
criminal investigations. 2 Subpoenas to lawyers were rare and the gov-
ernment was generally not successful in enforcing them. 3 However,
Justice Department officials in the Reagan administration reexamined
traditional assumptions about attorney subpoenas as they formulated
aggressive approaches to criminal investigation. They concluded that
prosecutors had wrongly assumed this investigative technique to be un-
available.. 4 The Department then took the position that the attorney
subpoena was a "new investigative tool" that could be used if non-
privileged information in the hands of the attorney could be identi-
fied. 5 This change in prosecutorial doctrine coincided with develop-
ments in substantive criminal liability that made it more feasible to
characterize the provision of legal services as relevant to proof of a
criminal enterprise.'
The result has been an explosion of subpoenas to lawyers, based
upon aggressive and imaginative exploitation of arguable exceptions to
Id. at 517 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Special Project, The Work Product Doc-
trine, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 760, 787 (1983) (Hickman advanced the idea that "protec-
tion of work product immunity is necessary to prevent attorneys from testifying against
their clients.").
2 W. Landers, Remarks at the Conference on Defending the Right to Counsel,
held at New York University Law School (Nov. 15, 1986) (tape recording on file with
the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
"3 See, e.g., United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1977)
(upholding subpoena, but stating broad grounds for disallowance); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 674 (5th Cir. 1975) (invalidating subpoena compel-
ling attorneys to testify before grand jury as to fee information); Tillotson v. Boughner,
350 F.2d 663, 666 (7th Cir. 1965) (identity of client within attorney-client privilege);
Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623, 630-32 (9th Cir. 1960) (disallowing IRS subpoena for
client identity); cf. Rice v. Baron, 456 F. Supp. 1361, 1370 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (advocate-
witness rule "'was not designed to permit a lawyer to call opposing counsel as a wit-
ness and thereby disqualify him as counsel'" (citations omitted)).
14 See W. Landers, supra note 12.
15 See id.
a Prior to the advent of the RICO, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986), and Continuing Criminal Enterprise, 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986
& West Supp. 1987), statutes, a federal conspiracy was considered to be concluded once
its original singular objective had "ended in success or failure," Krulewitch v. United
States, 336 U.S. 440, 443 (1949). This rule generally precluded evidence concerning
the legal defense from being admitted in the trial of the underlying conspiracy. How-
ever, under modern theories of "enterprise" liability, which permit proof of conspiracies
with multiple conspiratorial objectives, prosecutors have been able to characterize pro-
vision of legal services in particular cases as a "fringe benefit" of the criminal enter-
prise, and thus relevant to proof of its existence. See e.g. In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982) (agreement to provide legal services
stands on same legal footing as provision of "any other portion of the conspiracy's
fruits").
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the attorney-client and work-product privileges." One national survey
of over 1000 practicing criminal defense lawyers found that attorneys
were subpoenaed infrequently prior to 1980, but documented a "dra-
matic increase" in the practice since then, with an "enormous" jump
between 1983 and mid-1985.l More recent statistics released by the
Department of Justice indicate a steady increase in the number of at-
torney subpoenas approved by the Criminal Division.'9 The record in
17 See Fried, Too High a Price for Truth: The Exception to the Attorney-Client
Privilege for Contemplated Crimes and Frauds, 64 N.C.L. REv. 443, 471-76 (1986)
(expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction has encouraged federal prosecutors to make
greater use of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege); Glanzer &
Taskier, Attorneys Before the Grand Jury: Assertion of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Protect a Client's Identity, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1070, 1070-71 (1984) ("It
is apparent from a number of recent investigations that attorney testimony before the
grand jury has become an increasingly favored tool of prosecutors in discovering infor-
mation or proof necessary to build a case against the target of an investigation."); J.
Backman, The Lawyer-Client Subpoena: A Proposal for Reform 8 (Apr. 30, 1987)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review)
("[O]ver the past decade, the government has discovered that the lawyer-client sub-
poena is a powerful weapon, capable of severely weakening its only barrier to unbri-
dled investigation and prosecution.").
18 See Genego, Risky Business: The Hazards of Being a Criminal Defense Law-
yer, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at 2, 40.
19 In May 1986, the Department released a statistical analysis of grand jury sub-
poenas to lawyers during the first six months in which the Department's attorney sub-
poena guidelines were in effect, July 18, 1985 through February 18, 1986. See Letter
from William Landers, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Division, to Laurie Robinson, Director, ABA Section of Criminal Justice [hereinafter
Letter of May 19, 1986]. In December, 1986 the Department released a statistical
analysis for the period March 1 through July 31, 1986 for both grand jury and trial
subpoenas. See Letter from William Landers, Deputy Associate Attorney General, to
Laurie Robinson [hereinafter Letter of December 12, 1986].
According to these statistics, in the course of the 12 months surveyed, the Depart-
ment of Justice approved more than 400 requests to issue grand jury subpoenas to
attorneys. See Letter of Dec. 12, 1986, supra; Letter of May 19, 1986, supra.. In the
first six month period there were 169 such subpoenas. Of these, 45 were for informa-
tion concerning a client who was currently represented by the attorney, and 26 of these
were issued to attorneys who were representing the client in connection with the same
grand jury investigation. See Letter of May 19, 1986, supra.
In the second period, the Department reported 242 grand jury subpoenas and 45
trial subpoenas. Of the 49 grand jury subpoenas issued to attorneys who represented
clients in criminal matters, more than one-third were issued to attorneys who were
representing clients in investigations in which the subpoenas were issued. See id. Two
of the trial subpoenas were to attorneys who then represented the client, or who had
previously represented the client in the same matter but had withdrawn or had been
disqualified by court order. See id. at Table 2.
The December 1986 analysis also provided a breakdown of categories of informa-
tion sought, which included:
a) Documents-corporate/financial/real estate documents.
b) Fee information includ[ing] subpoenas for documents and/or for
testimony regarding fees paid to attorneys, including amount, source, and
identity of fee payors.
c) Testimony sought from an attorney as a "fact witness," [including]
[Vol. 136:1783
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the only case to focus on the rate of such subpoenas suggests a much
heavier actual use of attorney subpoenas in the field than is indicated in
the Justice Department statistics: in that district, the government ad-
mitted to issuing from 50 to 100 such subpoenas per year.20 The Jus-
tice Department's statistics show, moreover, that attorney subpoenas
have not been directed to criminal defense lawyers alone. On the con-
trary, the "vast majority" have been directed to civil attorneys.21
B. The Problem With Attorney Subpoenas
Serving a subpoena upon defense counsel in a criminal case in
order to obtain information about the attorney's client is extremely
problematic: disruptive at best, and fatal to the client's representation
at worst. As one court put it, "[tihe serving of a subpoena under such
circumstances will immediately drive a chilling wedge between the at-
torney/witness and his client."
'22
The power to subpoena one's adversary usually carries with it the
situations in which an attorney was a witness to some event or transaction
in a setting in which no privilege applied; for example, where an attorney
was a witness to a business transaction involving the client and a third
party. Additionally, where the attorney currently represented the client on
a criminal matter, either grand jury or trial, the testimony concerned ob-
servation of some fact not related to the current representation.
d) [T]estimony concerning "advice or assistance" .. . [where] the in-
formation was not privileged because of the crime/fraud exception or be-
cause the client had raised an advise [sic] of counsel defense; for example
where the attorney had issued a letter opinion with regard to an invest-
ment scheme which was now the subject of a fraud investigation ... [or
for example,] testimony [was sought] concerning advice or assistance ren-
dered by the attorney to the client regarding an investment scheme or
treatment of an item on a tax return where the investment scheme or tax
return is the subject of the criminal trial and the client is claiming a "reli-
ance on counsel" defense.
Id. Attachment to Tables.
20 See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 658 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated,
United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehear-
ing en banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that
the three judges voting to affirm the district court also "abide by the majority panel
opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en bane court that voted to
affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion).
The Court of Appeals noted that, given the district's statistics for criminal business, the
government's admission raised the possibility of attorney subpoenas in from 10.7% to
32.6% of criminal cases in the district. See Klubock, 832 F.2d at 658; see also infra text
accompanying notes 133-43 (discussing Klubock).
21 See Rudolf & Maher, A Subpoena a Day Keeps the Clients Away, CRIM.
JUST., Fall 1986, at 4, 5. Although this Article focuses on attorney subpoenas issued by
prosecutors and grand juries, much of our discussion relates equally to subpoenas used
in civil litigation.
22 Klubock, 832 F.2d at 653 (majority opinion of panel).
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power to control who the adversary will be.2" If the lawyer has been
subpoenaed to the trial, or will be as a result of a grand jury subpoena,
the lawyer will usually have to withdraw, since a lawyer is generally
prohibited from acting as an advocate and witness in the same trial.24
2 See id. at 654 (service of subpoena "potentially gives [prosecutor] control over
who shall be his attorney/adversary").
24 See id. (service of subpoena will possibly cause defense attorney to resign as
counsel for his client since Canons of Ethics prohibit the attorney from being witness
and attorney in the same case); United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 12-13 (1st Cir.
1986) ("[A]ttorneys [can]not serve the dual roles of defense counsel and sworn govern-
ment witnesses in the same trial."). Compare Kroungold v. Triester, 521 F.2d 763, 766
(3d Cir. 1975) (when attorney is called as witness and nothing in her testimony will be
prejudicial to her client, attorney is not disqualified) and Ross v. Great Atd. & Pac.
Tea Co., 447 F. Supp. 406, 408 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("Under [D.R. 5-102(B)], the party
seeking disqualification must show that the testimony to be elicited from his adversary
will be prejudicial to the latter's client.") and MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B) (1980).
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also prohibit the lawyer from acting as
both advocate and witness whenever "the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness,"
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7(a) (1987), thus, apparently, for-
bids representation when the lawyer is subpoenaed whether or not the testimony is
prejudicial to the client. The rule, however, is subject to certain exceptions including
when "disqualification of the lawyer would work substantial hardship on the client."
Id. Rule 3.7(a)(3).
Whatever theoretical leeway is granted by the advocate/witness rules when the
attorney is an unwilling witness, however, is severely limited by the unlikelihood that
the attorney can act as witness and simultaneously fulfill her duty to provide effective
representation. See State v. Thomas, 53 Or. App. 375, 380, 631 P.2d 1387, 1390
(1981)
[A] defendant's right to effective representation may be impaired while his
counsel is on the witness stand for the prosecution, because: (1) it is im-
possible for the defendant to consult with his attorney; (2) the defendant
cannot call attention to any inaccuracy in the attorney's testimony or sug-
gest proper questions for cross-examination; (3) it is difficult, to say the
least, for the lawyer, as a witness, to determine what objections should be
made to questions asked him; (4) it is difficult for the lawyer to determine
what questions to ask himself on cross-examination, and if he attempts to
cross-examine himself the proceedings may take on a ludicrous appear-
ance; and (5) it is difficult for the lawyer to answer questions so as not to
antagonize the jury and still maintain a favorable impression.
See also Kaeser v. State, 96 Nev. 955, 958, 620 P.2d 872, 873 (1980) ("The defendant
is unable to consult with his counsel when counsel is on the stand as a witness. It is
most difficult for counsel to protect the record and at the same time keep in mind what
questions should be asked himself on cross-examination."); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-9 (1980) ("An advocate who becomes a witness is in the
unseemly and ineffective position of arguing his own credibility.").
In any event, the duty of the witness to tell the objective truth is fundamentally
different from the duty of the defense lawyer to present a one-sided impression to the
fact-finder.
[Aibsent a voluntary plea of guilty, we ...insist that [defense counsel]
defend his client whether he is innocent or guilty. The State has the obli-
gation to present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even
if he knows what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the
police, or reveal any confidences of his client, or furnish any other infor-
[Vol. 136:1783
ATTORNEY-SUBPOENA PROBLEM
Moreover, withdrawal should occur at the earliest possible time, so that
new counsel will have time to prepare.
A grand jury subpoena is no less problematic than a trial sub-
poena even though the advocate/witness disqualification rules do not
strictly apply. Turning the lawyer into a government witness usually
places the lawyer in an immediate and very serious conflict of interest
requiring withdrawal in and of itself. Obviously a conflict exists if the
testimony is harmful to the client; and if the testimony is unhelpful to
the prosecution or if the attorney is uncooperative, the lawyer may face
recriminations from the government. In a real sense, the subpoena sig-
nifies official prosecutorial interest in the lawyer's own conduct and
involvement with her client, the defendant or grand jury target. The
attorney's actions in the case will now be subjected to grand jury scru-
tiny. The lawyer thus acquires what she earlier lacked: a personal in-
terest in the matter.25
This situation creates considerable opportunities for abuse.26 The
power to hale an attorney into the grand jury room to investigate the
mation to help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a
truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or indecisive,
that will be his normal course. Our interest in not convicting the innocent
permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to put the State's case in the
worst possible light, regardless of what he thinks or knows to be the
truth. Undoubtedly there are some limits which defense counsel must ob-
serve but more often than not, defense counsel will cross-examine a prose-
cution witness, and impeach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is
telling the truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks
is lying. In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and as
part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel, we coun-
tenance or require conduct which in many instances has little, if any, rela-
tion to the search for truth.
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 257-58 (1967) (White, J., dissenting in part and concur-
ring in part) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
25 In Klubock, the court stated:
More subtle, but perhaps more important in terms of the ethical setting
S. . , is the immediate conflict of interests created between the attorney/
witness and his client by the serving of a subpoena .... As a witness, the
attorney/witness has separate legal and practical interests apart from
those of his client. These interests may or may not coincide with those of
the attorney/witness and his client. The mere possibility of such a conflict
is sufficient to create a problem.
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, United States v.
Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en banc,
which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also United States v.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the three judges
voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority panel opinion");
supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court that voted to affirm the
district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion).
2 "Last, but not necessarily least, is the potential for abuse that underlies the
natural tendencies promoted by adversarial postures." Id. at 654.
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attorney's representation of a client has an enormously intimidating ef-
fect. This threat may well be the very point for the unscrupulous prose-
cutor. "The unregulated power to subpoena attorneys also carries with
it the potential for mischief inherent in any situation where one adver-
sary can pummel his opponent without violating the rules."2 As noted
in a recent American Bar Association report, "the prospect of striking
at one's adversary by inflicting crippling blows on the adversary's attor-
ney has proven increasingly irresistible to many lawyers."2
Moreover, if during the course of the representation, the attorney
disappears into the grand jury room to answer questions about the cli-
ent, the client may lose confidence in either the attorney's loyalty or her
ability to protect the client and to maintain the client's confidences.29
Thus is eroded the relationship of trust and confidence that lies at the
heart of the attorney-client relationship.3"
Furthermore, the subpoena causes incalculable damage even if it
is, or can be, quashed. The subpoena typically "open[s] a 'second front'
when the defendant has neither the time nor the resources to success-
fully fight on two battlegrounds.""1 Subpoena litigation is usually fast-
2 ABA, Report to the House of Delegates 6 (Feb., 1986) [hereinafter ABA Re-
port I] (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); see In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 970 (D. Mass. 1985) (find-
ing that subpoenas were unreasonable and oppressive); In re Grand Jury Matters
(Hodes and Gordon), 593 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D.N.H.) (actions of U.S. Attorney held
to be harassing), affd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
28 ABA Report I, supra note 27, at 2.
29 See Alschuler, The Search for Truth Continued, the Privilege Retained: A Re-
sponse to Judge Frankel, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 67, 73 (1982) (critical issue in assess-
ing attorney-client privilege is "whether [the client] should 'know as well as he is ever
likely to know the future that giving the truth to his attorney will not hurt him.' ")
(citation omitted); Weiner, Federal Grand Jury Subpoenas to Attorneys: A Proposal
for Reform, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 95, 102-03 (1986) (discussing chilling effect on
attorney-client relationship "[w]hether or not . . . [the subpoena] infringes on any rec-
ognized privilege"); see also infra note 224 (participants in federal grand jury proceed-
ings are generally forbidden to disclose content of the proceedings).
" "Most obvious is the fact that the client is uncertain at best, and suspicious at
worst, that his legitimate trust in his attorney may be subject to betrayal." United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, United States v.
Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en banc,
which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see United States v.
Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the three judges
voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority panel opinion");
supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court that voted to affirm the
district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion); see also Mor-
ris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 21 & n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in the result)
(noting need for "relationship characterized by trust and confidence" between attorney
and client); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-3.1 (commentary) (2d ed.
1980) ("Nothing is more fundamental to the lawyer-client relationship than the estab-
lishment of trust and confidence.").
31 Rudolf & Maher, The Attorney Subpoena: You Are Hereby Commanded to
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track, intensive litigation that diverts counsel from the task of represen-
tation and often entails great expense. Indeed, the prudent attorney
who receives a subpoena will retain her own lawyer to litigate that
issue. As noted in the ABA Report:
The insidious nature of these indirect attacks is familiar to
everyone who has inflicted, endured, or witnessed them: they
divert attention from the merits of the case and generate
complicated controversies about tangential issues; they sap
the morale of the opposing advocate by focusing attention on
his own conduct or by forcing him to defend his own inter-
est; and they channel precious time, energy, and resources
into diversionary skirmishes which inevitably weaken the op-
position's taste and strength for the main fight.3 2
A correlative problem is posed by the risk of improper compromise
or even betrayal of the client's rights under the pressure of the govern-
ment's investigative power. The subpoena creates the risk that the sub-
poenaed attorney will disclose confidential information that can and
should remain confidential. The nub of the problem is that attorneys do
not always move to quash a subpoena even when they should."3 Indeed,
an attorney may not even inform the client that the attorney has been
subpoenaed."'
Reasons for not revealing the subpoena's existence to the client are
Betray Your Client, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1986, at 14, 16.
32 ABA Report I, supra note 27, at 2; see also Klubock, 832 F.2d at 653 (panel
opinion):
Closely related to [the problem of conflict of interest] is the diversion of
interests and resources brought about by the conversion of the attorney
into a witness. The attorney now has a difficult "second front" to deal
with, in which he must dedicate his own time and resources to looking
after his own interests, while at the same time trying to protect those of
his client. The strain on the attorney's time/resources, to say nothing of
the disruption in his/her client's representation, goes far beyond a mere
conflict of interest situation.
"' This is hardly a speculative fear. In Klubock, 832 F.2d at 649, the Government
admitted that "approximately 50-100 federal grand jury subpoenas per year have been
served in Massachusetts upon attorneys for documents or testimony relating to a person
represented by that attorney." (Record Appendix at 32). Yet, as the district judge
noted, "given the numbers that you [the plaintiffs] cite as to the numbers of subpoenas
that have been sent out and the number of motions to quash, relatively few [attorneys]
appear to avail themselves of that opportunity and, thus, may be compromising their
clients interests after all." (Record Appendix at 500). The government conceded in the
district court that "most lawyers do not file a motion to quash." (Record Appendix at
500).
34 See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege After Attorney Disclosure, 78 MiCH.
L. REV. 927, 927-29 (1980) (citing examples of attorney waiver of the attorney-client
privilege without clients' consent and/or knowledge).
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readily apparent. The subpoena creates intense pressure by virtue of
the fact that the attorney herself may have been threatened with, or
fear, investigation. Even if she has no reason to fear such investigation,
she may wish to avoid confrontation or publicity. She also may lack the
money, energy, time, knowledge or ability to wage the aggressive and
complicated battle that subpoena litigation frequently involves. As an
order denying a motion to quash a subpoena may not be immediately
reviewable, she may hesitate to resist the subpoena and thereby risk
contempt, which she may well have to do if the client's appellate rights
are to be saved. 5 At the same time, the subpoena constitutes an appar-
ent legal command to produce evidence and thus offers a convenient, if
insufficient, justification for capitulation. 8 It presents an ideal opportu-
nity for a prosecuting attorney to take advantage of a compromised
lawyer in order to obtain client information.
3 7
An unregulated policy of subpoenaing attorneys to give evidence
about clients will, over the long term, inevitably have an inhibiting ef-
fect on legal practice. Clients will hesitate to consult lawyers unless
absolutely necessary and will delay retaining counsel as long as possi-
ble."' Persons who cannot on their own afford the crushing costs of
modern-day criminal litigation will find it difficult or impossible to ob-
tain financial assistance from friends, colleagues or supporters, who
may fear exposure and embarrassment. Lawyers will insulate them-
selves from all but the bare minimum of knowledge that seems neces-
" In three circuits, the denial of a motion to quash is not immediately appealable.
Therefore, in those circuits the attorney must be cited for contempt in order to obtain
review of an adverse decision concerning her assertion of attorney-client privilege. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461, 1464-66 (10th Cir. 1983)
(client could not appeal denial of motion to quash subpoena directed at his attorney as
it was reasonable to expect the attorney to risk a citation for contempt), enforced, 727
F.2d 941, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819 (1984); In re Sealed Case, 655
F.2d 1298, 1300-01 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (an order denying a motion to quash a subpoena
duces tecum served on a corporation's outside counsel is not immediately reviewable);
In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15, 16 (1st Cir. 1980) (discussing "well-settled rule that
an attorney has no right to appeal from a district court order directing him to testify
before a grand jury with respect to an attorney-client communication" as it is not a
reviewable final decision).
" For an example in the civil context, see In re Beiny, 129 A.D.2d 126, 131-37,
517 N.Y.S.2d 474, 476-81 (1987), where petitioner's counsel obtained confidential at-
torney-client privileged documents of a trust by issuing a fraudulent deposition sub-
poena to the attorney-custodian of the records.
17 See United States v. Ofshe, 817 F.2d 1508, 1510-11 (11th Cir.) (prosecutor
induced defense lawyer under investigation for corruption to use a "body bug" to tape
confidential conversations with client), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 451 (1987).
" See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel) 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d
Cir. 1984) (stating that "we would be less than candid not to concede that the lack of a
privilege against disclosure of the fact of an attorney-client relationship may discourage
some persons from seeking legal advice at all").
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sary for discrete legal services, thus increasing the risk of mistake and
ineffective representation.
Such a policy will also demoralize the profession. It is not an over-
statement to say that the government's new. attorney subpoena policy
has caused widespread fear and anxiety in the criminal defense bar.39 It
has also affected lawyers' decisions whether to take criminal cases, or
certain types of criminal cases.4" "Although it is impossible to quantify
accurately, it is logical to presume that the unrestricted use of [such]
subpoenas . . . will tend to discourage attorneys from providing repre-
sentation in controversial criminal cases."
41
II. CURRENT TREATMENT OF ATTORNEY SUBPOENAS
As the use of attorney subpoenas has dramatically increased in re-
cent years, the courts, the organized bar, and even the United States
Department of Justice have adopted various methods of regulating the
practice. This section focuses on the responses of each of these players
to the attorney subpoena controversy.
A. The Judicial Response
A number of courts have noted with dismay the increasing use of
attorney subpoenas and have responded accordingly.42 The judicial re-
'9 See In re Grand Jury Matters (Hodes and Gordon), 593 F. Supp. 103, 107
(D.N.H.) (attorney subpoenas have not merely a "chilling effect" but "an arctic effect
with the non-salutary purpose of freezing criminal defense attorneys into inanimate ice
floes, bereft of the succor of constitutional safeguards"), afl'd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.
1984).
40 See Genego, supra note 18, at 7 (fourteen percent of attorneys who reported
having made changes in their practice as a result of government activities "had decided
not to accept a specific criminal case or cases" because of Justice Department practices,
including fee forfeiture and use of attorney subpoenas).
41 United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 653-54 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated,
United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehear-
ing en banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the three
judges voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority panel
opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court that voted to
affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion).
42 See, e.g., Klubock, 832 F.2d at 657 (upholding Massachusetts rule requiring
prior judicial approval before grand jury subpoenas could be served on attorneys); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 973-75 (2d Cir. 1985) (gov-
ernment must show relevance and reasonable need before issuing a subpoena to attor-
ney to testify before a grand jury against her client), vacated, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.
1986) (en banc); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1008-
11 (4th Cir.) (a preliminary showing of relevance and need is required before the gov-
ernment can subpoena an attorney to testify before a grand jury), vacated as moot, 697
F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services
Center), 615 F. Supp. 958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985) (government has the burden of show-
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sponse has developed primarily in the courts' greater use of their super-
visory power.43 However, in other areas where increased protection for
attorneys might have been found-such as attorney-client privilege,4"
constitutional protection,45 and the use of ethical prohibitions on disclo-
sure of client confidences and secrets 4 -little development has
occurred.
1. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine
At one time it might have been thought that the attorney-client
privilege, which is an absolute bar under federal law and that of every
state,47 together with the work-product doctrine, which is a more condi-
tional privilege,4 would prevent the use of attorney subpoenas. Al-
though the attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the common law
privileges,49 its reach has been confined in a variety of ways, and it is
no longer safe to assume that the privilege will bar the attorney's testi-
mony. For one thing, in order to invoke the privilege, one must satisfy
each of the several requirements of the privilege. As set forth by Profes-
sor Wigmore, the factual situation of the party asserting the privilege
must meet the following requirements:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a pro-
fessional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the com-
munications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence
ing that information subpoenaed was necessary to its investigation, and that it could not
gain that information by other reasonable means); In re Grand Jury Matters (Hodes
and Gordon), 593 F. Supp. 103, 105-07 (D.N.H.) (subpoenas were invalid where they
sought disclosure of attorney-client fee arrangement and where client had state and
federal criminal cases pending), aff d, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 946 (E.D. Pa. 1976) ("work product is a
valid ground on which to refuse a grand jury's subpoena"); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F.
Supp. 683, 685-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (attorney charged with perjury for denying that he
had spoken to a third person was not compelled to testify before a grand jury concern-
ing attorney-client conferences).
43 See infra text accompanying notes 112-116.
41 See infra text accompanying notes 47-55.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 95-111.
46 See infra text accompanying notes 156-169.
47 See J. Backman, supra note 17, at 26.
48 See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975) (holding that work-
product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508-15 (1947), applies to crimi-
nal proceedings). In Nobles, the Court stated that work-product protection is "even
more vital" in criminal matters than in civil matters: "The interests of society and the
accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence
demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation of
each side of the case." Id. at 238.




(5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently pro-
tected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.50
These requirements leave considerable room, of course, for avoiding the
privilege. One of the gaps that prosecutors frequently exploit is the lack
of privilege protection for information concerning fees and client iden-
tity.51 Although the courts have developed several doctrinal approaches
to filling this gap,52 none provides much certainty that the disclosure of
such information cannot be compelled.53
A second important exception to the attorney-client privilege is the
crime/fraud doctrine, under which communications that would other-
wise be privileged lose that protection if they were made for the pur-
pose of committing a crime or fraud."' This exception has been greatly
extended in recent years, especially by federal prosecutors, to the point
where it has substantially eroded the scope of attorney-client
privilege. 55
Finally, the conditional privilege for attorney work product is
rather limited and subject to many of the same exceptions as attorney-
client privilege. It therefore is not a reliable bar to compelled testimony
by the attorney.
50 Id. § 2292; see also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) (Judge Wyzanski's classic formulation of the privilege).
See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 49, ch. 82, §§ 2290-2329 (presenting the
eight requirements for "communication between attorney and client").
"' See generally Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Federal Grand
Jury: Client's Identity and Fee Arrangements, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 67, 84-85 (1985)
(discussing the exceptions to the general rule that clients' identity and fee information
do not fall within the attorney-client privilege); Note, Benefactor Defense Before the
Grand Jury: The Legal Advice and Incrimination Theories of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 537, 539-40 (1985) (examining "whether and when the
identity and fee arrangements of a client should be privileged").
52 See infra text accompanying notes 58-63.
" See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
"' See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (communica-
tions between attorney and client are not privileged if "made in furtherance of a crime,
fraud, or other misconduct"); In re Berkley & Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980)
("Attorney-client communications lose their privileged character when the lawyer is
consulted not with respect to past wrongdoings but rather to further.a continuing or
contemplated criminal or fraudulent scheme."); see also J. WIGMORE, supra note 49,
§ 2298 (contrasting disclosure of "prior wrongdoing" that is privileged and "future
wrongdoing" that is not). See generally Silbert, The Crime-Fraud Exception to the
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Doctrine, the Lawyer's Obligations of
Disclosure, and the Lawyer's Response to Accusation of Wrongful Conduct, 23 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 351 (1986).
15 See Fried, supra note 17, at 446. ("[Tjhe exception has been abused and dis-
torted, above all in the service of federal prosecutors, to the point where the attorney-
client privilege has been seriously eroded.")
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a. Client Identity and Fee Information
Client identity and fee information have generally been considered
to fall outside the scope of attorney-client privilege either because they
do not constitute communications relating to the substantive legal advice
rendered by the attorney or because they are not confidential.56 Since
client identity and fee information are present in every case, a rule that
always permits the prosecutor to seek such information directly from
the attorney gives the prosecutor enormous power, especially when the
attorney's response to such inquiries would cause her withdrawal or
disqualification. 57 In an effort to mitigate the harshness of this rule, the
courts have developed two distinct rationales for protecting client iden-
tity and fee information in certain circumstances.
58
The narrower rationale, known as the legal advice theory, protects
against disclosure of client identity or fee arrangements when such dis-
closure would be "tantamount to" revealing an "otherwise protected
confidential communication."59 This principle, which has been adopted
by a majority of the circuits, limits the type of communications that
qualify for protection to those which are necessary to obtain legal ad-
vice and "which might not have been made absent the privilege."'6
Under the broader rationale, known as the incrimination theory, an
attorney cannot be compelled to disclose such information if it would
11 The client's identity, for example, will not normally be a secret in civil or crim-
inal litigation.
57 Courts have held that client identity and fee information is relevant and needed
in a wide variety of cases. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Shargel) 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (government may seek client identity and fee
information "as evidence of unexplained wealth which may have been derived from
criminal activity, . . . and as evidence of the violation of the tax laws.") Some courts
have held that when the government seeks such information from the attorney, it must
"show a need for the information sought." In re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe,
Esq.), 602 F. Supp. 603, 607 (D.R.I.) (citing United States v. Pioggia, Cr. No. 82-231-
K (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1983) (Keeton, J.)), affd sub nom. In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Wilson), 760 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1985).
" Both rationales-the legal advice theory and the incrimination theory-derive
from Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960), which neatly exemplifies both
theories. In Baird, an attorney was asked to pay back taxes anonymously to the IRS on
behalf of his clients. See id. at 626. The attorney refused to comply with an IRS sub-
poena seeking the clients' identities, claiming attorney-client privilege. See id. at 627.
The Ninth Circuit upheld the attorney's claim of privilege, see id. at 634-35, noting
that disclosure of the client's identity would be tantamount to revealing the substance of
the attorney's communication with the clients, see id. at 630, (i.e., legal advice theory),
and would also provide the government with the missing link needed to indict the cli-
ents, see id. at 633 (i.e., incrimination theory).
'9 See Note, supra note 51, at 555-57 & n.107 (quoting In re Grand Jury Inves-
tigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 453 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1246
(1984)).
60 See id. at 556 (citing Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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have a "significant incriminatory effect." '61 This theory, which a minor-
ity of the circuits has adopted, has developed as a bar to disclosure in
two types of situations: (1) where "a strong probability exists that dis-
closure of such information would implicate that client in the very
criminal activity for which legal advice was sought,"6 2 and (2) where
"the disclosure of the client's identity by his attorney would have sup-
plied the last link in an existing chain of incriminating evidence likely
to lead to the client's indictment."63
Both rationales provide inadequate protection of the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. First, neither provides sufficient certainty to permit
the would-be client, even a legally sophisticated one, to know whether
she can safely retain and confide her identity to the attorney. This is so
because both rationales depend ultimately on what the prosecutor
knows at the time she seeks to serve or enforce the subpoena. The client
generally does not know what information the prosecutor has at any
given time, and therefore cannot determine whether her disclosure to
the attorney will incriminate her or amount to a disclosure of an other-
wise privileged communication.
Second, neither rationale is broad enough to protect the client fully
from revelation of matters that are incriminating but completely unre-
lated to the action at bar. Revelation of the client's identity, for exam-
ple, might expose the client to prosecution for an offense (such as those
related to immigration status) wholly unrelated to the one for which
she sought legal advice. Similarly, revelation of fee information might
expose the client to prosecution for income tax offenses which, again,
are completely unrelated to the matter for which she sought
representation.
Finally, because both of these rationales offer increasing protection
for client identity and fee information as the prosecutor learns more
about the client, they provide the prosecutor with the perverse incentive
to subpoena the attorney during the early stages of a grand jury investi-
gation, even though further investigation might reveal non-attorney
sources for the information sought from the attorney. 4 In short, neither
rationale provides much of a bulwark against the use of attorney sub-
61 See Note, supra note 51, at 553-55.
62 United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977).
63 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlik), 680 F.2d 1026, 1027 (5th Cir. 1982)
(en banc).
64 See Case Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege as a Protection of Client
Identity: Can Defense Attorneys be the Prosecution's Best Witnesses?, In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 81, 91 (1983); Note, supra note 51,
at 571.
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poenas; they may in fact be counterproductive.6 5
b. Crime/Fraud Exception
Use of the crime/fraud exception by prosecutors as a means of
compelling attorney testimony has "skyrocketed" in the past few
years.6 6 The exception's usefulness to prosecutors is readily apparent
since it not only sweeps away the various rationales for barring the
disclosure of client identity and fee information, 7 but negates the privi-
lege altogether, thus potentially making available to the prosecutor all
communications between the attorney and client.
6 8
Given the enormous power of this exception as a prosecutorial
tool, one would expect the courts to have erected rather steep barriers
to its successful invocation. Yet a review of the cases suggests precisely
the opposite. Courts often permit the crime/fraud exception to be es-
tablished on the basis of an in camera or ex parte showing." Some
courts require only a prima facie showing by the prosecutor. ° In some
circuits, the prosecutor, in order to establish a prima facie case, need
not adduce any independent evidence beyond the statement or informa-
tion that she is seeking to elicit.7 1 Moreover, on appeal, the trial court's
decision to apply this exception and allow full disclosure of attorney-
client communications is generally reviewed under a deferential "abuse
6 See Developments in the Law, Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1450, 1522-24 (1985) (arguing that client identity and fee information should be con-
sidered privileged communications subject to an intent-based crime/fraud exception).
66 See J. Backman, supra note 17, at 50.
67 See Fried, supra note 17, at 485-86.
68 See, e.g., United States v. Horvath, 731 F.2d 557, 562 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting,
first, that attorney-client communications become non-privileged when attorney is con-
sulted to further a prospective crime or fraud, and second, that consultation regarding
past crimes becomes inseparable from the consultation regarding prospective crimes).
Some courts have held that in order to invoke successfully the crime/fraud exception,
the prosecutor must show a nexus between the alleged unlawful scheme and the attor-
ney-client communications the disclosure of which is being sought. See, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ("government must first make a
prima facie showing of a violation sufficiently serious to defeat the privilege, and sec-
ond, establish some relationship between the communication at issue and the prima
facie violation" (footnote omitted)).
69 See Silbert, supra note 54, at 362-64 & nn.88-89.
70 See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (discussing the prima
facie evidence standard in earler cases); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723
F.2d 1461, 1467 (10th Cir. 1983) (analyzing the determination of the prima facie evi-
dence standard), enforced, 727 F.2d 941, 946 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 819
(1984).
"' See Fried, supra note 17, at 464-66; Silbert, supra note 54, at 365-67. But see
United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir.) (requiring that "government
must first establish a prima facie case of fraud independently of the said communica-
tions"), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972).
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of discretion" standard, which makes reversals unlikely."
Even more disturbing, however, is the tendency of the exception to
swallow up the rule of attorney-client privilege altogether. In United
States v. Horvath," for example, the court held that the crime/fraud
exception is satisfied when the "primary purpose" of the attorney-client
relationship was to "conceal from the government the extent of [the
client's] financial holdings and [the client's] sources of income." 4
Under such a standard, the attorney must walk an increasingly fine
line indeed between the path of zealous advocacy that her ethical duties
require and a course that leads her to become a grand jury target or a
witness against her client. Moreover, if concealment of information
(e.g., "benefactor" payments) by the attorney is viewed as an act "in
furtherance of" the criminal activity, the exception does in fact swallow
the rule since the criminal activity might then be considered "on-going"
as long as the attorney and her client continue to conceal the
information.
7 5
As this brief sketch indicates, the crime/fraud exception further
weakens the protections of the attorney-client privilege and provides
another means by which the attorney can be compelled to testify
against her client.
c. Work-Product Doctrine
The need to protect attorney work product, and the subsequent
creation of a "work-product" rule, arose with the advent of pretrial
discovery. In the civil context, broad pretrial discovery began with the
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938.7 The rules
limiting the use of civil discovery techniques to obtain attorney work
product followed with the Supreme Court's decision in Hickman v.
Taylor7 in 1947 and the adoption of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(3) in 1970.78
72 See Silbert, supra note 54, at 364 & n.97.
73 731 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1984).
71 Id. at 562. Although the Horvath court relied on the finding that the conceal-
ment served to facilitate "an ongoing criminal conspiracy," once the court concluded
that the crime/fraud exception applied, it decided that the attorney could therefore be
compelled to testify about past, as well as "ongoing" crimes. Id.
75 See Note, supra note 51, at 579-80 (tracing problems that flow from construing
"benefactor" payments as an act of concealment that extends the duration of the
conspiracy).
78 See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1938 at 1-2 (describing the history of the
adoption of the rules of civil procedure).
7 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
78 See Feldman, The Work Product Rule in Criminal Practice and Procedure,
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In federal criminal cases, the work-product rule derives from
Hickman, as modified in 1966 by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
16(b)(2), which creates an absolute bar to discovery of certain types of
tangible trial preparation material." In United States v. Nobles,80 the
Court made it clear that Hickman applied to criminal as well as civil
cases, but that Rule 16(b) applied only to pretrial discovery., Thus, in
determining the precise scope of the work-product protection for crimi-
nal defendants, one must look to the overlapping and sometimes con-
flicting lines of authority deriving from Hickman, Nobles, and Rule
16.82
Work-product protection is important because neither the attor-
ney-client privilege nor the fifth amendment necessarily bars discovery
of the materials that an attorney prepares and collects. As noted above,
attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure only communications
between the client and attorney-neither information obtained by the
attorney from third parties, nor documents from any source (unless
they are attorney-client communications) are protected. Moreover, the
fifth amendment applies only to statements compelled from the lips or
files of the defendant herself rather than from the lips or files of her
attorney. 3 Notwithstanding the need for broad protection in this area,
however, a review of the work-product doctrine indicates that the privi-
lege is a rather limited one, at least from the standpoint of resisting an
attorney subpoena.
First, the doctrine pertains only to materials prepared in anticipa-
50 U. GIN. L. REV. 495, 504-06 & n.33 (1981). For a discussion,and a graphic illus-
tration of the ways in which Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) differs from Hickman, see gener-
ally Clermont, Surveying Work Product, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 755, 755-56 (1983)
(stating that the situation after Hickman is even more confusing than before).
" Rule 16(b)(2) was promulgated as part of Rule 16(c) in 1966, was relocated in
1975, and was made gender-neutral in 1987. It now states:
Information Not Subject to Disclosure. Except as to scientific or medical
reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of
reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents made by the de-
fendant, or the defendant's attorneys or agents in connection with the in-
vestigation or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant,
or by government or defense witnesses, or by prospective government or
defense witnesses, to the defendant, or the defendant's agents or attorneys.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(2).
so 422 U.S. 225 (1975).
8" See id. at 234-40 (prosecution was entitled to inspect at trial a report prepared
by a defendant's investigator because (1) Rule 16(b) did not limit production of such
documents at the time of trial, and (2) the relevant work-product protection under
Hickman had been waived by the investigator's testifying at trial).
2 Although a detailed discussion of the availability of work-product protection in
state criminal proceedings lies outside the scope of this Article, such protection is avail-
able in a majority of states. See Feldman, supra note 78, at 495 & n.5.
81 See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-14 (1976).
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tion of litigation.84 This limitation leaves open to discovery all materials
accumulated by the lawyer at a stage not involving litigation or in mat-
ters not related to any litigation.8" Also, as noted above, much of the
material sought by prosecutors through attorney subpoenas relates to
tax advice, real estate transactions, and other matters not necessarily
related to litigation,86 and therefore would often not be covered by the
work-product rule.
Second, even though work-product privilege can be asserted by ei-
ther the attorney or the client,87 the client may not be aware of the
existence of the attorney subpoena and therefore may not be able to
assert the privilege at a time when it is needed.
Third, for material covered by the Hickman-Nobles line of cases
rather than by Rule 16 (i.e., intangible work product), the privilege is a
qualified one that arguably can be overcome upon a proper showing of
need by the prosecution. Indeed, even the protection for opinion work-
product has been held not to be absolute.8
Fourth, the crime/fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege
applies to the work-product privilege. Thus the prosecution could seek
to open the door to all defense materials, written or unwritten (except
possibly mental impressions of the attorney), upon a prima facie show-
ing of crime or fraud.89
Fifth, it is not clear that the work-product privilege continues after
the representation in which the material was accumulated ends.9"
Finally, a decision adverse to the defendant's rights under the
work-product doctrine will seldom be challenged successfully on appeal
because the courts typically view such decisions as within "the wide-
ranging discretion of the trial judge.""1
Taken together these limitations suggest that in the attorney sub-
poena setting the work-product doctrine will often fail in its essential
purpose-the creation of a zone of privacy within which the attorney
can represent the client's interests "free from unnecessary intrusion by
84 See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510; FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
85 See J. Backman, supra note 17, at 32.
88 See supra note 21 and accompanying text; supra note 19.
817 See Silbert, supra note 54, at 359.
88 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 401-02 (1981).
89 See In re Special September Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 63 (7th Cir. 1980);
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798, 802-03 (3d Cir. 1979); In
re Grand Jury Proceedings (John Doe, Esq.), 602 F. Supp. 603, 607-08 (D.R.I.
1985). See generally Silbert, supra note 54 at 355-58 (discussing the work-product
privilege and the crime/fraud exception).
90 See generally Note, The Work Product Doctrine in Subsequent Litigation, 83
COLuM. L. REv. 412, 421-24 (1983) (noting split of authority on this question).
9' See Feldman, supra note 78, at 511 & n.74.
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opposing parties and their counsel." 2
d. Conclusion
Today, when a client consults an attorney for legal advice, the at-
torney can no longer confidently tell the client that all the information
entrusted to the attorney is privileged and therefore will be kept in
strict confidence. The traditional expectations about the scope of the
attorney-client and work-product privilege no longer hold true.9 3 In-
deed, more than one commentator has suggested that under the emerg-
ing case law of "no attorney-client privilege," the attorney would be
well advised to give each new client a Miranda-like warning about the
manner in which the client's disclosures to the attorney could be used
against her by means of forced disclosure from the mouth of the attor-
ney!94 In short, judicial developments in the area of attorney-client and
work-product privilege have, if anything, undermined rather than
strengthened attorneys' ability to challenge attorney subpoenas.
2. Constitutional Protection
A number of attorneys and commentators have looked to the pro-
tections afforded by the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States
Constitution as a bulwark against the increasing use of attorney sub-
poenas. For example, attorneys have frequently-and sometimes suc-
cessfully-fought subpoenas on the ground that the attorney's likely
subsequent disqualification would infringe her client's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel. 95
This argument was accepted in United States v. Diozzi, where the
First Circuit noted that although the defendant's constitutional right to
be represented by counsel of choice is a qualified (not absolute) right,
the government "bears a heavy burden" of justification if it seeks to
disqualify counsel on the ground that her testimony is needed at trial.98
Indeed, the Diozzi court went on to hold that an erroneous order dis-
qualifying counsel from a criminal case should result in an automatic
reversal, without any showing of prejudice by the defendant.9"
92 Nobles, 422 U.S. at 237 (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-11).
9 See supra notes 42-92 and accompanying text.
See Fried, supra note 17, at 491 n.270; Note, supra note 51, at 568 n.171.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 15-16 (1st Cir. 1986) (govern-
ment must "justify" any request to disturb a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
counsel of choice). For a brief discussion of a civil litigant's constitutional right to coun-
sel, see Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
See Diozzi, 807 F.2d at 12.
See id. at 15-16; see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 443
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Most courts faced with a motion to disqualify a defendant's attor-
ney, however, tend to balance the harm to the client and the infringe-
ment of her sixth amendment right to counsel against the government's
need for the attorney's testimony and the need to enforce ethical stan-
dards barring the attorney from serving as advocate and witness.98 Bal-
ancing these interests, courts have reached a variety of results, including
partial disqualification and disqualification of some but not all of the
attorneys involved in a case. 9
In a number of cases, courts have relied on sixth amendment con-
cerns as the basis for overturning decisions to disqualify a defendant's
counsel of choice.100 Such a result is consistent with the long-standing
(1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds) ("in a criminal case an erroneous
order disqualifying the lawyer chosen by the defendant should result in a virtually
automatic reversal"); Linton v. Perini, 656 F.2d 207, 211-12 (6th Cir. 1981) (harmless
error rule does not apply when court effectively deprived defendant counsel of choice by
unreasonably denying motion for continuance), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982);
Releford v. United States, 288 F.2d 298, 301-02 (9th Cir. 1961) (no showing of
prejudice required where court refused to grant continuance to defendant whose re-
tained counsel was hospitalized). It is, of course, well settled that the denial of counsel
altogether is grounds for automatic reversal, without any showing of prejudice. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 659 n.25 (1984); Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 9-10 (1954).
91 See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064, 1070 (2d Cir. 1982)
(balancing defendant's right to counsel of choice against "the need to preserve the high-
est ethical standards of professional responsibility"), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984);
United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1975) (disqualification motion
calls for "cautious and sensitive consideration and balancing of individual constitutional
protections, public policy and public interest in the administration of justice, and basic
concepts of fundamental fairness"). A similar analysis is used by the courts in deter-
mining whether to allow forfeiture, under 21 U.S.C. § 853 (Supp. III 1985 & West
Supp. 1987), of the funds that a defendant seeks to use for attorney's fees. See, e.g.,
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 923-25 (4th Cir. 1987) (balancing individual
interests against government interests); United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1471-72
(5th Cir. 1986) (same).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 975-77 (8th Cir. 1982) (re-
versing one attorney's disqualification but upholding another's); United States v. Dolan,
570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir. 1978) (upholding disqualification of defense counsel);
Garcia, 517 F.2d at 272 (reversing disqualification order); United States v. Castellano,
610 F. Supp. 1151, 1167-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (permitting defense counsel to'continue
representation of criminal defendant in all phases of the litigation except at trial, where
counsel could be present but not at counsel table).
Ironically, the principle on which several of these courts disagree is whether the
constitutional right to counsel of choice includes the ability to waive the right to assis-
tance of an attorney who either is a potential witness or has a conflict of interest.
Compare Garcia, 517 F.2d at 272 (client can waive that right) with Dolan, 570 F.2d
at 1177 (client cannot waive that right). The fact that criminal defendants, when faced
with the decision whether to give up their counsel of choice or stick with an attorney
who may be compelled to testify against them, often choose the latter, poignantly sug-
gests the need for regulation of the government's use of defense attorneys as witnesses.
100 See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 797 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1986); Cun-
ningham, 672 F.2d at 1070. Unfortunately, such decisions have limited value in the
grand jury setting, where the client's sixth amendment rights have not yet attached. See
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principle that the sixth amendment right to counsel entails the right to
independent counsel not subject to governmental control."'0 Such a re-
sult also reflects the practical reality that one of the most important
decisions that a criminal defendant makes is her choice of counsel.' 2
Several commentators have suggested that the sixth amendment
right to counsel, when taken together with the fifth amendment's pro-
tection against forced self-incrimination, makes the attorney-client priv-
ilege a constitutional imperative.' 0 3 Other commentators have built on
the holding in Fisher v. United States104 to argue that client identity
and fee information, which have generally been considered nonprivi-
leged,' O5 are entitled to "constitutionalized" protection under the attor-
ney-client privilege because if the client could not be compelled to dis-
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972) (holding that sixth amendment right to
counsel does not attach until the criminal prosecution commences). Even so, the Su-
preme Court has never squarely addressed the question of whether a grand jury wit-
ness has a right to counsel. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 603 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring). But see In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957) (dictum
denying that grand jury witnesses have the right to counsel). It is worth noting that
fifteen states now permit grand jury witnesses the right to have counsel in the grand
jury room. See Comment, Grand Jury-Attorney-Client Privilege and Right to Coun-
sel for the Party Under Investigation, In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 19
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 509 n.178 (1983).
.01 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321 (1981) ("Implicit in the con-
cept [of a defendant's right to have counsel at every step in a proceeding] . . . is the
assumption that counsel will befree of state control." (emphasis added)); Ferri v. Ack-
erman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) ("indispensable element of the effective performance
of [appointed counsel's] responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the Gov-
ernment" (emphasis added)); United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 645 (1st Cir.
1987) (sixth amendment rights implicated by use of attorney subpoenas because "prose-
cutor is potentially given control over who shall be his attorney/adversary"), vacated,
United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehear-
ing en banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also
United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en bane) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that
the three judges voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority
panel opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en bane court that voted
to affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion).
102 See United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 956, 958 (3d Cir. 1986) (recognizing
the importance of the defendant's selection of counsel to her ability to shape a defense);
United States v. Laura, 607 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir. 1979) (noting that "attorneys are not
fungible"); Note, Second Circuit Rejects Need Requirement for Attorney Subpoena, In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon John Doe, Esq. (Slotnick) 60 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 524, 525 n.3 (1986).
"0I See, e.g., Rosenfeld, The Transformation of the Attorney-Client Privilege: In
Search of an Ideological Reconciliation of Individualism, the Adversary System, and
the Corporate Client's SEC Disclosure Obligations, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 495, 510-11 &
n.89 (1982) (citing authority for the constitutionalization of the attorney-client privi-
lege); Note, supra note 51, at 567-68 (arguing that permitting an attorney to testify
conflicts with a defendant's right against self-incrimination).
104 425 U.S. 391, 396 (1976) (holding that the attorney-client privilege, not the
fifth amendment, protects attorneys from forced disclosure of material that clients
would have a fifth amendment right not to produce).
100 See supra notes 56-65.
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close such information, neither can the attorney.'" 6
Although these theories of broader constitutional protection of the
attorney-client relationship would provide a powerful rationale for reg-
ulating attorney subpoenas, the courts have generally alluded to sixth
amendment concerns as merely "implicated" by attorney subpoenas. 10 7
The courts typically have relied on their supervisory power rather than
the Constitution as the legal basis for limiting the use of attorney sub-
poenas and thus preventing disqualification.' 8 On the other hand, state
constitutions, which generally include a right to counsel at least as
broad as that contained in the federal Constitution,'0" have in some
cases been interpreted as barring the use of a criminal defendant's at-
torney as a witness against her."0 Thus, there may be reason for opti-
mism that state constitutional development could play a significant role
in regulating attorney subpoenas."'
3. Supervisory Power
Even before the adoption of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(c), which authorizes courts to quash subpoenas where "compliance
108 See Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 17, at 1096-98.
'' Compare, e.g., United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 645 (1st Cir. 1987)
(divided panel) (sixth amendment rights implicated by use of attorney subpoenas), affg
639 F. Supp 117 (D. Mass. 1986), vacated, 832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1987) (en banc)
(equally divided court affirming district court opinion and citing panel opinions) with
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1985)
(noting that the preliminary showing requirement is not compelled by the sixth amend-
ment) and In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1012 (4th
Cir.) (same), vacated as moot, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
108 See infra text accompanying notes 112-69.
109 See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. II, § 10 (right to be heard "by himself and his
counsel") (emphasis added); LA. CONsT. art. I, § 13 ("[a]t each stage of the proceed-
ings, every person is entitled to assistance of counsel of his choice" (emphasis added));
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 9; (same language as Arkansas). Cf W. VA. CONST. art. III,
§ 14 (defendant entitled to "reasonable time to prepare for his defense").
110 See, e.g., Kaeser v. State, 620 P.2d 872, 874 (Nev. 1980) (mere testimony by
defendant's counsel did not violate defendant's right to fair trial, but trial court violated
state constitution's right to counsel provision by allowing state to call defendant's attor-
ney as witness to impeach alibi testimony); State v. Thomas, 53 Or. App. 375, 380-81,
631 P.2d 1387, 1391 (1981) (same). For a discussion of the development of state consti-
tutional principles as an autonomous body of law, separate from federal constitutional
law, see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
111 Query whether a state constitutional right to counsel can limit federal prosecu-
tors' use of attorney subpoenas: the supremacy clause and federalism issues that such
an approach raises resemble the issues raised in Klubock about applying a state ethical
rule if that rule has not also been adopted by the federal courts in that district. See
infra notes 195-96 and accompanying text. A similar problem could arise if the appli-
cable state and federal rules were identical but were interpreted more restrictively by
the state courts.
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would be unreasonable or oppressive,""' 2 federal courts exercised their
inherent supervisory power over grand juries to curb abuses. 13 Courts
responded to particular types of prosecutorial misconduct, such as the
knowing use of false or perjured testimony, by dismissing indictments
or quashing subpoenas." 4 In the context of attorney subpoenas, a num-
ber of courts have employed their supervisory powers to establish a re-
quirement that the government make a preliminary showing before an
attorney subpoena would be enforced or before the subpoena could be
served on the attorney.
1 1 5
The three most prominent decisions in this area came from the
First, Second, and Fourth Circuits, which have reached arguably incon-
sistent conclusions with respect to the use of supervisory power to regu-
late attorney subpoenas." 6 In each of these circuits, the courts have
either overturned panel decisions or issued opinions with sharply
worded dissents-all of which indicates the highly unsettled state of the
± FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).
113 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943) (district courts' super-
vision of grand juries includes the dtity of "establishing and maintaining civilized stan-
dards of procedure and evidence"); see also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 297
(1947) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
114 See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 1983); United States
v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942-43 (N.D. Ill. 1979); United States v.
Gallo, 394 F. Supp. 310, 315 (D. Conn. 1975).
11' See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp.
958, 964 (D. Mass. 1985) (approving requirement of prior judicial approval of attor-
ney subpoena); In re Punelli, Misc. No. 1-39, slip op., (S.D. Iowa Sept. 17, 1985)
(same) (on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review); United States v.
Pioggia, No. 82-231-K, slip op., (D. Mass. Sept. 21, 1983) (same) (on file with the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review); see also Williams v. District Court, 700 P.2d
549, 554-56 (Colo. 1985) (en banc) (prosecutor must make preliminary showing of
need for attorney subpoena).
A number of courts have stated that a preliminary showing of need could be re-
quired under the court's supervisory power, but declined to establish such a rule on the
facts then before the court. See e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d
1221, 1222 & n.1 (9th Cir. 1983) (court is free to require preliminary showing of need
and relevance of attorney subpoena but declines to do so on facts of present case); In re
Pantojas, 628 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir. 1980) (declining to "impose [such a rule] on
district courts within the circuit at this time" but stating that "[d]istrict courts should..
. feel free to require such showings by the government as a means of assuring them-
selves that grand juries are not overreaching") (emphasis added).
118 See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, United
States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en
banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the three
judges voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority panel
opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court that voted to
affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985), vacated,
781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc); In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey),
676 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir), vacated as moot, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
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law on this subject.
a. Doe and Harvey
In Doe and Harvey, the Second and Fourth Circuits reversed or
vacated decisions in which panels required a showing of need and rele-
vance as a prerequisite for enforcing an attorney subpoena. In both
cases, the panel decision had held that such a requirement was neces-
sary to protect the attorney-client relationship because of the inade-
quacy of the protection afforded by the attorney-client privilege.1 ' Al-
though neither of these opinions remains the law in its respective
circuit-Doe was reversed en banc and Harvey was vacated as
moot 8-the rationale of those decisions retains its force and has been
relied on by other courts." 9 Nevertheless, the overwhelming trend in
the federal courts has been a rejection of a preliminary showing re-
quirement for attorney subpoenas. Indeed, except for the Third and
possibly the Tenth Circuit, every circuit that has considered creating
such a requirement has declined to do so.' 20 In those two circuits, the
courts require the government to make a preliminary showing of need
and relevance in order to obtain enforcement of all grand jury subpoe-
117 Doe, 759 F.2d at 975 (holding that "when a subpoena is issued to an attorney
to testify before a grand jury investigating his client ... where the attorney will be
disqualified if he testifies, the Government should make a preliminary showing of rele-
vance and reasonable need" to maintain "the integrity of the attorney-client relation-
ship"); Harvey, 676 F.2d at 1012 ("preliminary showing.., is appropriate to protect a
person's interest in maintaining a proper attorney-client relationship").
118 According to Judge Murnaghan, who dissented from the panel decision in
Harvey, the Fourth Circuit was likely to reverse the panel opinion when the target fled
the jurisdiction and the case was rendered moot. See United States v. Morchower, No.
83-1816 (4th Cir. Sept. 28, 1983), slip op. at 405, cited in In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238, 247 n.4 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1108 (1986).
"" See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Legal Services Center), 615 F. Supp. at
964 ("[m]indful of importance of the attorney-client relationship to our system of jus-
tice, the Court adopts the reasoning of Harvey and Doe" and requires preliminary
showing of need).
20 See In re Grand Jury Proceedings (85 Misc. 140), 791 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir.
1986); In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation, 783 F.2d 1488, 1525 (11th Cir.),
cert. denied, 106 S.Ct. 3273 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe,
781 F.2d at 243; In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Weiner), 754 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ing (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
It is noteworthy that in none of these cases did the court hold that it lacked the
authority, under its supervisory powers, to adopt a need and relevance requirement. On
the other hand, these cases demonstrate a clear disinclination to use supervisory powers
to carve out a special rule for attorney subpoenas. See, e.g., In re Klein, supra, at 634
(calling requirement of preliminary showing "a thoroughly bad idea").
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nas regardless of whether they are directed to attorneys or others. 121
The courts that have rejected a need and relevance test for attor-
ney subpoenas have relied primarily on a line of Supreme Court cases
that have emphasized the broad nature of the grand jury's inquiry and
its historic freedom from outside interference. The cases most fre-
quently cited are United States v. Dionisio'22 and Branzburg v.
Hayes. 2 ' An examination of those two cases, however, suggests that
neither one stands in the way of courts that wish to adopt a prelimi-
nary showing requirement.
In Dionisio, the Supreme Court held that requiring production of
voice exemplars during grand jury proceedings did not violate the wit-
ness's rights under the fourth and fifth amendments. 24 The portion of
Dionisio relied on by those courts that have rejected a preliminary
showing requirement for attorney subpoenas is a widely quoted dictum
that "[a]ny holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and
preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and
frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration
of the criminal laws.11 2 5 Yet nothing in Dionisio would prohibit federal
courts from adopting prophylactic rules such as those that have been
adopted by other courts to regulate the use of attorney subpoenas.'2
Rather, Dionisio cautions that in exercising their supervisory powers
over the grand jury, federal courts should avoid measures that hamper
the grand jury's performance of its lawful duties.' Moreover, the ra-
tionale cited in Dionisio for steering clear of the grand jury's
work-namely, the grand jury's historic independence and its dual role
as protector of the public against abusive prosecutions and an investiga-
tive arm of the prosecution 2 8-has in recent years been called sharply
121 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963, 965 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975); in re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I),
486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983). The Tenth Cir-
cuit, citing Schofield I, has required a preliminary showing of relevance and "proper
purpose" before enforcement of a grand jury subpoena would be allowed. In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Dorokee Co.), 697 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1983).
1 2 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
123 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
124 Dionisio's holding that a preliminary showing of the prosecutor's need for
voice exemplars is not affirmatively required by the fourth or fifth amendments is
hardly surprising given the Court's conclusion that neither amendment was relevant to
the compelled production of such exemplars. See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 5, 10.
125 Id. at 17.
126 See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
127 Of course, notwithstanding this caution, courts have recognized that the privi-
leges which protect the attorney-client relationship apply in the grand jury room.
128 See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 12-13; see also United States v. Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S.




In Branzburg, the Supreme Court held that the first amendment
does not give reporters a blanket privilege against appearing and testi-
fying before a grand jury. Of course, this holding does not stand in the
way of a court's using its supervisory power to require a preliminary
showing before enforcing a grand jury subpoena directed to attorneys
or reporters. Indeed, as Justice Powell's concurrence points out, report-
ers may still look to the courts' supervisory power for protection if "the
grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good faith."'13 More-
over, the majority acknowledges the possibility that such a privilege
could be created by federal or state legislation. 3
Notwithstanding the weakness of the rationale for rejecting the use
of supervisory power to require a preliminary showing for enforcement
of attorney subpoenas, the majority of circuits have so far declined to
adopt such a requirement as a general matter. 32
b. United States v. Klubock
The attorney subpoena issue has been litigated in the First Circuit
in a context markedly different from that in which the issue arose in
the Second and Fourth Circuits. Rather than ruling on the enforcement
of a particular attorney subpoena, the First Circuit13 has examined the
question of whether the District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts may, as an exercise of its supervisory or rulemaking power, adopt
a local rule known as Prosecutorial Function 15 or "PF 15,"' ' which
129 In particular, attorneys and commentators have questioned whether the grand
jury retains any vestige of independence from the prosecutor. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 165-68.
130 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
131 See id. at 689. In applying Branzburg, the Third Circuit held that, even in
the absence of an absolute first amendment privilege for reporters, courts are free to
adopt a common law privilege for reporters. See United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d
139, 146 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981); Riley v. City of Chester,
612 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir. 1979). In addition, at least one circuit has held that a
qualified privilege is available to reporters in grand jury proceedings. See Bursey v.
United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1075-78 (9th Cir. 1972).
132 It is worth noting, however, that whatever constraints the federal courts may
feel due to Dionisio and its progeny, do not apply to state courts. The latter are, of
course, free to strike a different balance in overseeing grand juries.
13I See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, United
States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st. Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en
banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see also United
States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating that the three
judges voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the majority panel
opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court that voted to
affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel opinion).
134 Codified at SuP. JUD. CT. RULES 3:08 of the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
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requires prior judicial approval of attorney subpoenas. 3 ' The federal
District Court upheld the validity of PF 15,36 as did the First Circuit,
which, in a 2-1 panel decision, described the rule as "a limited, reason-
able response to what appears to be a mounting professional prob-
lem.' 1 37 On rehearing en banc after vacating the panel decision, the
First Circuit divided 3-3, thereby reinstating the panel's affirmance of
the district court." 8
In the Klubock litigation, the principal issue was whether PF 15
conflicts with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a), which autho-
rizes the court clerk to issue subpoenas in blank to any party without
prior judicial approval,' or with Supreme Court precedent-such as
Branzburg and Dionisio-concerning the traditionally unfettered scope
of grand jury inquiry. 4" The government contended (1) that PF 15 is
more than a local procedural or ethical rule, and, therefore, the district
court did not have the authority to adopt it, and (2) that because Rule
17 does not contemplate prior judicial approval of subpoenas, PF 15 is
in conflict with it.' 4 ' Although the Klubock courts focused on whether
PF 15 is a substantive or merely procedural rule, they did not lose sight
sachusetts and incorporated by reference into Local Rule 5(d)(4)(B) of the Federal
District Court for the District of Massachusetts. PF 15 states that "[i]t is unprofes-
sional conduct for a prosecutor to subpoena an attorney to a grand jury without prior
judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor seeks to compel the attorney/
witness to provide evidence concerning a person who is represented by the attorney/
witness."
135 For a more detailed discussion of PF 15 and rules similar to it, see infra text
accompanying notes 187-93. See also Gertner, On Trial! A Disciplinary Rule that
Limits Attorney Subpoenas, CRIM. JUST., Fall 1986, at 2, 6 (discussing PF 15
litigation).
16 See Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 117.
137 Klubock, 832 F.2d at 657.
1'38 It is significant that only one of the dissenting judges reached the merits of the
district court's power to adopt PF 15. See id. at 668 (Campbell, C.J., dissenting). The
other two dissenters questioned the validity of PF 15 solely on the ground that the rule
had been adopted, in their view, without sufficient adherence to the procedural require-
ments of notice and comment. See id. at 671 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The Justice De-
partment has decided not to seek review of this decision in the Supreme Court.
139 FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a) provides as follows:
A subpoena shall be issued by the clerk under the seal of the court ....
The clerk shall issue a subpoena, signed and sealed but otherwise in blank
to a party requesting it, who shall fill in the blanks before it is served. A
subpoena shall be issued by a United States magistrate in a proceeding
before him, but it need not be under the seal of the court.
140 See supra text accompanying notes 122-32.
141 See Klubock, 832 F.2d at 652-56. Even though PF 15 was clearly a federal
district court rule (as well as a state rule) by the time the First Circuit considered its
validity, the government continued to argue that enforcement of PF 15 by the Com-
monwealth of Massachusetts against federal prosecutors would violate the supremacy




of the underlying controversy regarding the use of attorney subpoenas.
Indeed, none of the Klubock opinions" 2 challenge the view that regula-
tion of attorney subpoenas may be needed. Rather, they focus on
whether such regulation should be sought in a different manner, such
as through national legislation or more rigorous rulemaking
procedures. 43
c. Other Applications of Supervisory Power
Another direction in which the courts have turned in regulating
the use of attorney subpoenas can be seen in those cases in which the
courts have made an ad hoc decision not to enforce the subpoena be-
cause of the particular circumstances under which it was issued.144 In
such cases, the courts seek to balance the government's need for the
evidence sought against the harm that the subpoena may cause to an
attorney-client relationship.145
One of the most noteworthy examples of that type of case-by-case
application of supervisory power is In re Grand Jury Matters (Hodes
and Gordon),"46 in which the First Circuit upheld a district court deci-
sion to quash five attorney subpoenas. The district court found that the
U.S. Attorney's actions, in issuing grand jury subpoenas to five attor-
neys who were on the verge of trial in state court, were "without doubt
harassing" and had a "chilling effect" on the attorneys' representation
of their clients.' 47 Affirming the district court's decision to quash the
subpoenas, the First Circuit emphasized the timing of the U.S. Attor-
ney's actions and avoided creating a blanket rule concerning attorney
142 There have been six: the district court opinion by Judge Zobel, 639 F. Supp.
117, 118-26 (D. Mass. 1986); two opinions for the court of appeals by Judge Tor-
ruella, 832 F.2d at 650-58; id. at 665-68; two dissenting opinions by Chief Judge
Campbell, id. at 658-64; id. at 668-71; and a dissenting opinion by Judge Breyer, id.
at 671-75.
13 Chief Judge Campbell suggests that such regulation should be implemented at
a national level, either by legislation or rulemaking. See 832 F.2d at 661. Judge
Breyer's opinion states that such regulation, if adopted locally, must first run the
gauntlet of notice and comment prescribed in FED. R. CRIM. P. 57. See 832 F.2d at
671. .44 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sturgis), 412 F. Supp. 943, 945-46
(E.D. Pa. 1976) (declining to enforce attorney subpoena with respect to work product,
but noting that "[tihe matter at issue can be understood only in light of the unusual
nature of the criminal investigation which underlies it").
"I See In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) ("balancing the
claim of need for the testimony against the potential hurt of it" and finding "no over-
riding necessity for compelling the attorney's testimony at this time").
146 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
147 See In re Grand Jury Matters (Hodes and Gordon), 593 F. Supp. 103, 107
(D.N.H.), affd, 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
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subpoenas. 4" Indeed, the court intimated that it might permit such
subpoenas in the future if they are issued "at a more suitable moment
or upon a more substantial showing of immediate urgency and
need." 49 Nevertheless, the court reaffirmed the principle that federal
courts have the supervisory power to quash subpoenas "even though
the subpoenaed materials are not covered by a statutory, constitutional,
or common law privilege.' 50 In doing so, the court expressed a partic-
ular concern about the threat that attorney subpoenas pose to the right
to counsel.
1 5 '
Courts have also exercised their supervisory power in connection
with attorney subpoenas by barring the prosecution from calling the
defendant's attorney as a witness unless her "testimony is both neces-
sary and unobtainable from other sources.' 52 In such cases, as in
Hodes and Gordon, courts have struck a balance between the govern-
ment's stated need for the attorney's testimony and the potential resul-
tant harm to the defendant.' 53 Although analogous types of supervisory
power have been used in a wide variety of circumstances to curb
prosecutorial abuses 54 the courts have nevertheless held that their su-
pervisory power over attorney subpoenas is narrow.155 The courts' su-
148 See Hodes and Gordon, 751 F.2d at 19-20; see also In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceedings (Wilson), 760 F.2d 26, 27 (1st Cir. 1985) (noting that timing of the subpoena
was an important factor cited by the Hodes and Gordon court).
148 Hodes and Gordon, 751 F.2d at 19-20.
150 Id. at 17-18.
151 See id. at 17 (noting "the importance that the federal Constitution places upon
the right to counsel"); id. at 18 (noting that the attorney subpoena "implicates serious
policy concerns").
152 See, e.g., United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759, 760 (5th Cir.) (noting that
"[als a general rule, a party's attorney should not be called as a witness), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 824 (1975); cf. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1986)
(holding that the prosecution failed to justify disqualifying appellants' chosen counsel).
1' Federal courts exercise an analogous power under FErn. R. EvID. 403 to bar
testimony that would be cumulative or otherwise unnecessary. See United States v.
King, 827 F.2d 864, 867 (1st Cir. 1987).
154 See Beale, Reconsidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitu-
tional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 Col.uM. L.
REv. 1433, 1434 (1984) (tracing the origins of federal courts' supervisory power) (n.b.:
page numbers 1433 and 1434 are repeated in the cited volume); cf. McNabb v. United
States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943) (noting that the "Court has, from the very beginning
of its history," formulated evidentiary rules to exercise its "supervisory authority over
the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts").
... See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 781 F.2d 238 (2d Cir.) (en
banc) (reversing panel decision, reported at 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985), that would
have required the government, as a precondition to subpoenaing an attorney's testimony
on attorney-client matters, to show that the testimony sought was both necessary to the
investigation before the grand jury and not reasonably available otherwise), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (85 Misc. 140),
791 F.2d 663, 665-66 (8th Cir. 1986) (declining to require a government affidavit
showing legitimate need and relevance of the attorney's testimony); In re Klein, 776
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pervisory power, therefore, is not an adequate means of curbing prose-
cutors' misuse of attorney subpoenas.
B. Ethical Rules
Until recently, one might have assumed that the ethical rules regu-
lating attorney conduct would make it impossible for prosecutors to ob-
tain information through the use of attorney subpoenas. Attorneys are
required, for example, (1) to assert the attorney-client and work-prod-
uct privileges that pertain to information obtained in the course of rep-
resenting a client,"5 6 and (2) to protect from disclosure information re-
lating to their clients even when that information is not covered by
attorney-client or work-product privilege.157 In addition, prosecutors
are bound by ethical rules which require them (1) to further the inter-
ests of justice instead of merely seeking to obtain convictions,'158 and (2)
to refrain from taking actions designed to harass an opponent'59 or to
circumvent applicable ethical rules. 60
In practice, however, these rules do not provide adequate safe-
guards for the attorney or the client with respect to attorney subpoenas
for several reasons. First, the rules governing disclosure of client secrets
and confidences permit attorneys to disclose them when "required by
F.2d 628, 634 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that grand juries and prosecutors, not courts, are
the arbiters of how much information a grand jury requires); In re Grand Jury Pro-
ceeding (Schofield), 721 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusing to require govern-
ment preliminary affidavit disclaiming ill intent in case of attorney subpoena); In re
Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983) (declining
to require government affidavit of need and relevance prior to compelling attorney's
testimony); In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.) (refusing "to afford attorneys
the right to refuse to appear before grand juries"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).
"56 See Silbert, supra note 54, at 359; cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1980) (exhorting attorneys to act in a way that "preserves the
evidentiary privilege"). But see id. EC 4-2, DR 4-101(C)(2) (noting that an attorney's
obligation to her client does not preclude disclosure of information when "required by
law").
157 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1980)
(broadly defining the scope of the information to be kept confidential by the lawyer);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcT Rule 1.6 comment [5] (1987).
158 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980) (prose-
cutor's "duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict"); id. DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer
may not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 & comment [1] (1987) (setting forth the prose-
cutor's special responsibilities as a "minister of justice" instead of merely an advocate);
id. Rule 8.4(d) (declaring it to be professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
159 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.1, 4.4 (1987).
160 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(2) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(a) (1987).
1988] 1815
1816 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
law or court order."1 61 While an attorney subpoena, by itself, may not
constitute sufficient legal compulsion to permit such disclosure, a court
order enforcing the subpoena certainly would. Second, the client may
never learn that the attorney has complied with a subpoena because
disclosure under court order or other legal compulsion, unlike disclo-
sure of secrets and confidences to which the client consents, does not
require the attorney to consult with her client prior to making the dis-
closure.16 2 Third, although the client generally has the right to inter-
vene in any proceedings in which the attorney may be compelled to
disclose otherwise privileged information, 6 3 a client who is unaware of
the attorney subpoena will never, as a practical matter, have the oppor-
tunity to exercise that right.'"
Finally, in a system where there is no routine judicial review of
attorney subpoenas, neither the courts nor the disciplinary authorities
may learn of the prosecutor's actions, in which case enforcement of the
relevant ethical rules is unlikely. The client may be aware of neither
the relevant ethical rules nor the disciplinary mechanism through
which they are enforced. Both the client and her attorney, moreover,
have a powerful incentive not to press disciplinary charges concerning
the attorney subpoena (1) because of the deferential manner in which
courts generally review a prosecutor's discretionary decisions, 6 5 and (2)
because the attorney and client are vulnerable to retaliation, from the
161 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(2) (1980);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1987). See Fried, supra note
17, at 497 ("Thus both the Model Code and the Model Rules make the attorney's
duties as an officer of the court independent of and always superior to the duties to his
or her client."). It is worth noting that such disclosure is not permitted under the pro-
posed American Lawyer's Code of Conduct, which rejects the "officer of the court"
rationale insofar as it is contrary to zealous advocacy. See id. at 497 & nn. 301-02.
162 Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(1)
(1980) (a lawyer may reveal confidences with the consent of the client(s) "but only
after a full disclosure to them") with id. DR 4-101(C)(2) (a lawyer may reveal confi-
dences when "required by law or court order").
16. See generally Glanzer & Taskier, supra note 17, at 1075-76 (noting that in
almost all circuits, the right of the client to intervene is upheld).
164 Thus, several of the proposed solutions to the attorney subpoena problem re-
quire notice to the client and an opportunity for the client to be heard before the sub-
poena can be served or enforced. See, e.g., NNRC proposal, § 2 (Appendix B); ABA
proposal (Appendix C).
165 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (noting the deci-
sion of whether or not to prosecute is poorly suited for judicial review); United States v.
Moran, 759 F.2d 777, 783 (9th Cir. 1985) (granting broad discretion to the prosecutor
regarding the timing of indictments), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986); United States
v. Williams, 738 F.2d 172, 175 n.2 (7th Cir. 1984) (allowing prosecutor broad discre-
tion to set priority on cases being handled); see also Fifteenth Annual Review of Crimi-
nal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1984-1985, 74
GEo. L.J. 621, 621 (1986).
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prosecutor, in various forms including further required appearances
before the grand jury.
166
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, adoption of ethical rules to
curb the use of attorney subpoenas remains an important means of reg-
ulating the prosecutor's conduct. A civil action against the prosecutor is
almost certain to fail because of the prosecutor's nearly absolute immu-
nity from civil liability.'67 Thus, enforcement of the applicable discipli-
nary rules provides one of the few mechanisms available to ensure that
prosecutors live up to their professional duties. 6 '
Some jurisdictions-such as the state courts of Massachusetts,
Tennessee, and Virginia and the Federal District Court of Massachu-
setts-have adopted ethical rules specifically aimed at curbing the mis-
use of attorney subpoenas. These rules, which are discussed more fully
below, 6 ' require prior judicial approval of subpoenas that seek infor-
mation concerning the attorney's client.
C. United States Justice Department Guidelines
In July 1985, the United States Department of Justice responded
to the growing concern of attorneys and bar associations about the use
of attorney subpoenas by issuing comprehensive attorney subpoena
guidelines. 7 0 While the Guidelines represent a candid acknowledgment
of the problems created by the Department of Justice's use of attorney
subpoenas, they are for the most part an ineffective means of remedying
those problems. Indeed, the Guidelines seem to institutionalize the
practice of subpoenaing attorneys.
168 This possibility did not escape the Klubock court, which noted the potential for
abuse in the use of attorney subpoenas, a result of the natural tendencies of the adver-
sarial process. See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 654 (1st Cir. 1987), va-
cated, United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May 1, 1987) (order granting
rehearing en banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and vacated its judgment); see
also United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (en banc) (Torruella, C.J.) (stating
that the three judges voting to affirm the district court's decision also "abide by the
majority panel opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half of the en banc court
that voted to affirm the district court's decision also adopted the vacated majority panel
opinion).
167 See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976) (noting the abso-
lute immunity granted to prosecutors). But see Taylor v. Kavanagh, 640 F.2d 450, 451-
53 (2d Cir. 1981) (describing a method of differentiating "quasi-judicial" acts-for
which the prosecutor receives absolute immunity-from "investigative" acts-for which
the prosecutor receives only qualified immunity).
168 See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429.
169 See infra notes 183-97 and accompanying text.
170 See J. Backman, supra note 17, at 14-15. The text of the Justice Department
guidelines, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.161(a) (1985) [hereinafter
GUIDELINES], appears in Appendix A of this Article.
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Noting that the use of attorney subpoenas involves "potential ad-
verse effects upon the attorney-client relationship,""'1 the Guidelines
call for the Department of Justice to "exercise close control over the
issuance of such subpoenas," '172 attempting in each case to "strike the
proper balance between the public's interest in the fair administration
of justice and effective law enforcement and [the] individual's right to
the effective assistance of counsel." ' The Guidelines acknowledge, in
particular, "the risk that the attorney will be disqualified from the rep-
resentation of the client as a result of having to testify against the
client."1"4
The Guidelines contain both procedural and substantive provi-
sions. The procedural provision requires that all attorney subpoenas
receive prior .approval from the Assistant Attorney General of the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.17 Such approval ap-
pears to be readily given.176
The substantive provisions of the Guidelines call for a five-step
analysis of the subpoena request by the Department of Justice. First,
the subpoena must be "reasonably needed" for the successful comple-
tion of a warranted criminal investigation or prosecution or civil litiga-
tion matter. Second, the Department must have exhausted the alterna-
tive means of obtaining the information sought. Third, the need for the
subpoena must outweigh the risk of damage to the attorney-client rela-
tionship, including the risk that the attorney will be disqualified from
representing her client because of the subpoena. Fourth, the subpoena
must be narrowly tailored as to subject matter and the time period cov-
ered. Finally, the information sought cannot be privileged.
1 7
The Guidelines represent a laudable attempt to regulate the De-
partment Of Justice's use of attorney subpoenas."78 They are, however,
171 GUIDELINES, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a)(E)(4).
17 Id. § 9-2.161(a).
173 Id. § 9-2.161(a)(A).
174 Id. § 9-2.161(a)(E)(4).
175 See id. § 9-2.161(a)(D).
178 During an eight-month period from March through October 1987 (for which
this information was available), Department officials rejected only ten requests for at-
torney subpoenas - i.e., slightly more than one per month. Oral report by Mark
Robinson, special counsel to the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division,
to Laurie Robinson, Director, ABA Criminal Justice Section, on October 30, 1987. Yet
the Department has approved, on the average, 33 attorney subpoenas each month dur-
ing the first year that the guidelines were in effect, according to their own statistics. See
Letter of December 12, 1986, supra note 19 (242 subpoenas from March 1, 1986 to
July 31, 1986); Letter of May 19, 1986, supra note 19 (169 subpoenas from July 18,
1985 to February 18, 1986).
17 See GUIDELINES, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a)(F)(2)-(6).
'78 Skeptics might wonder whether the Guidelines serve more as effort to deflect
or moderate criticism of the Department's use of attorney subpoenas than as a limit on
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an inadequate solution to the attorney subpoena problem for a number
of reasons. First and foremost, the Guidelines are completely unen-
forceable. The Department of Justice was not shy about this important
feature of the Guidelines, which is clearly stated:
These guidelines ... are set forth solely for the purpose of
internal Department of Justice guidance. They are not in-
tended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to create any
rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any
limitations on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative pre-
rogatives of the Department of Justice.
17 9
Moreover, even without this disclaimer, the unenforceability of a fed-
eral agency's internal guidelines is well established in case law. 80
Thus, the critical balancing of reasonable need versus harm to the at-
torney-client relationship is, in effect, left under the unilateral control
of the prosecution, which stands to benefit from its decision.
Second, there is no method for monitoring the implementation of
the Guidelines because they contain no disclosure requirement. Al-
though the Department of Justice has released its own statistics con-
cerning its use of attorney subpoenas, neither the bar, the courts, nor
the Department itself can be certain that those statistics tell the full
story. 8 '
Third, because the Guidelines require prosecutors to make a "rea-
sonable attempt" to pursue alternative sources of information before us-
ing a subpoena only if unsuccessful attempts would not "impair the
ability to obtain such information from [the] attorney,"1 2 there will
likely be many cases in which the effort to look elsewhere will not be
made, since such efforts might come to the attorney's attention and
thus, in the prosecutor's view, "impair" her ability to get the informa-
tion from the attorney.
their use.
t79 GUIDELINES, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a) (emphasis added).
180 See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 755-56 (1979) (evidence acquired
in violation of Internal Revenue Service electronic surveillance regulations need not be
excluded); cf. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785 (1981) (failure of Social Security
Administration employee to follow Claims Manual instructions in advising applicant
does not entitle applicant to retroactive benefits).
181 Compare, for example, the Department of Justice's admission that an average
of 50 to 100 attorney subpoenas were issued each year during the last four years (1983-
1986) in the District of Massachusetts alone, see Klubock, 832 F.2d at 658, with statis-
tics released by the Department of Justice in 1986, showing that 411 attorney subpoe-
nas had been issued nationwide. See supra note 19 and accompanying text; supra note
176.
182 GUIDELINES, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a)(B)-(C).
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Finally, because the Guidelines distinguish between privileged and
nonprivileged information, the Department can take advantage of the
overly broad exceptions to the attorney-client and work-product privi-
leges: the crime/fraud exception and the doctrines pertaining to client
identity and fee information.
D. The Bar Response
The organized bar has responded to the mounting concern over the
use of attorney subpoenas with rare unanimity. A number of state and
national bar associations, including the American Bar Association, have
adopted attorney subpoena proposals, some of which either have been
adopted or are presently under consideration by the courts and
legislatures.
The first such proposal, which was introduced by the Massachu-
setts Bar Association, called for prior judicial review of attorney sub-
poenas at an ex parte hearing in which the prosecution was required to
establish several factors: that the information sought was nonprivileged,
relevant, and unavailable from other sources; that compliance with the
subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive; and that the sub-
poena was not sought for purposes of harassment."i 3 This proposal was
adopted in part by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court as an
ethical rule ("PF 15"), which required that the prosecutor obtain prior
judicial approval of attorney subpoenas.18 4 The MBA proposal was
also adopted, with minor changes, by the American Bar Association in
..3 The MBA proposal states, in pertinent part:
RESOLVED, that it is the position of the MBA that it should be consid-
ered to be unprofessional conduct and inimical to the administration of
justice for a prosecutor or other government attorney to subpoena an attor-
ney to the grand jury, or to any state or federal administrative body with a
similar function, without prior judicial approval in circumstances where
the prosecutor or such other government attorney seeks to compel the at-
torney/witness to provide evidence concerning a person who at the time is
represented by the attorney/witness. "Prior judicial approval" in such
cases should be withheld unless, after a hearing conducted with due regard
for the need for the secrecy of grand jury proceedings, the court finds (1)
the information sought is not protected from disclosure by the attorney-
client privilege or the work-product doctrine; (2) the evidence sought is
relevant to an investigation within the jurisdiction of the grand jury (3)
compliance with the subpoena would not be unreasonable or oppressive
(4) the purpose of the subpoena is not primarily to harass the attorney/
witness or his or her client; and (5) there is no other feasible alternative to
obtain the information sought.
Mass. Bar Ass'n, Criminal Justice Section, Proposed Resolutions 421 (1985).
18 See MASS. SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT RULE 3:08 (PF 15) (1987). For discus-
sion of PF 15 and the text of the rule, see supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
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February, 1986, in a resolution that called for implementation of such
proposals throughout the United States." 5 In February 1988, the ABA
adopted a broader version of this proposal, introducing a number of
changes, such as an adversary proceeding.'86
In several other states, attorney subpoena proposals have been
adopted as ethical rules that require prosecutors to seek prior judicial
approval before issuing the subpoena. In Massachusetts, PF 15 has
been adopted by both the state and federal courts."8 " The Supreme
Courts in both Tennessee... and Virginia'89 adopted rules similar to
PF 15 in 1987; those rules have not yet been adopted by the federal
courts in those states. The Tennessee rule, codified as DR 7-103(c), is
somewhat broader than PF 15 because it applies to "any state and fed-
eral administrative body" with a function similar to a grand jury,
rather than only to grand juries.' 90 The Virginia ethical rule, codified
as DR 8-102(A) of the Rules for the Integration of the Virginia Bar, is
also somewhat broader than PF 15 in two respects: it covers past as
well as present representation, and it extends beyond grand jury pro-
ceedings to any criminal proceeding.' The Virginia Supreme Court
has also adopted a procedural rule, broader in scope than PF 15, which
requires notice to the attorney.' 2 In addition, six other states and the
188 The ABA Resolution, Appendix C, omits the "not unreasonable or oppres-
sive" element of the MBA proposal. In turn, it adds that findings made pursuant to the
hearing will have no effect on subsequent proceedings concerning the subpoena.
188 The ABA's 1988 Resolution calls for an adversary, not ex parte, proceeding;
covers both past and present representation; requires a showing that the information
sought is not only relevant but "essential to the successful completion of an ongoing
investigation or prosecution"; requires that the information sought must be listed with
particularity and must be reasonably limited by subject matter and period of time cov-
ered; and requires a showing that the prosecutor has exhausted all non-attorney sources
of the information sought. The text of the ABA's 1988 Resolution is reproduced in
Appendix D.
187 See supra text accompanying note 184 (noting the Massachusetts Supreme Ju-
dicial Court's adoption of PF 15); supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text.
188 TENN. CT. R. DR 7-103 (1987).
189 Supreme Court Rule Changes, 35 VA. B. NEws 23 (1987) [hereinafter Su-
preme Court].
'oo See TENN. Cr. R. DR 7-103 (1987).
'9' See Supreme Court, supra note 189, at 23.
12 See id. at 22-23. Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:12 states in pertinent part
as follows:
No subpoena or subpoena duces tecum shall be issued in any criminal case
or proceeding, including any proceeding before any grand jury, which sub-
poena or subpoena duces tecum is (i) directed to a member of the bar of
this Commonwealth or any other jurisdiction, and (ii) compels production
or testimony concerning any present or former client of the member of the
bar, unless the subpoena request has been approved in all specifics, in
advance, by a judge of the circuit court wherein the subpoena is requested
after reasonable notice to the attorney who is the subject of the proposed
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District of Columbia have considered adopting attorney subpoena
rules.1 93
subpoena. The proceedings for approval may be conducted in camera, in
the judge's discretion, and the judge may seal such proceedings. Such sub-
poena request shall be made by the commonwealth's attorney for the juris-
diction involved, either on motion of the commonwealth's attorney or upon
request to the commonwealth's attorney by the foreman of any grand jury.
Id.
193 The Rules Committee of the Rhode Island Supreme Court has recommended
to that Court adoption of an attorney subpoena rule that closely approximates PF 15.
The Court has not yet acted on that recommendation. Rules Committee, R.I. S.Ct.,
Proposed Rules of Professional Responsibility R. 3.8 (1987).
The Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar has adopted an attorney-
subpoena rule that is broader than PF 15. The D.C. Bar proposal covers past and
present attorney-client relationships and, with respect to the client, includes any "per-
son or entity" (emphasis omitted). Proposed Rule 3.8 (j). The proposal is now under
consideration by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Bd. of Governors, D.C.
Bars, Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct and Related Comments (Nov. 19, 1986).
Both Houses of the Illinois legislature passed an attorney-subpoena proposal,
which had been recommended by the Illinois State Bar Association but was vetoed by
Governor Thompson. The Illinois proposal, which is expected to be resubmitted in
1988, Letter from Mary McClain, Assistant Director, Legislative Affairs, Illinois State
Bar Association to David Hoffman (Dec. 2, 1987), is essentially identical to' the Febru-
ary 1986 ABA resolution. H.B. 192, 85th Gen. Assembly, Ill. (1987-88) (seeking to
amend the Act in effect since 1963). The Illinois State Bar Association has also submit-
ted a proposal requiring prior judicial approval of attorney subpoenas to the Illinois
Supreme Court, where it is now under consideration. See Petition to Amend Proposed
Rule 7-103 of Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility (No. MR4816) (Filed Feb.
11, 1988).
The Board of Governors of the Florida Bar adopted an attorney subpoena rule in
April 1987 and submitted it to the Florida Supreme Court for approval. The Court
recently rejected the proposal, that closely approximated PF 15. The Florida Bar Re:
Amendment to the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, No. 70366 (Fla., Oct. 22, 1987)
(WESTLAW, State Library, Fla. File) (discussing rejection of an added paragraph to
rule 4-3.8).
The New Hampshire Bar Association submitted a proposal to the state Supreme
Court's Rules Committee in June 1986 that closely approximated PF 15. The Rules
Committee adopted instead a rule which would make it unprofessional conduct for a
prosecutor to "issue or obtain the issuance of a subpoena without good cause." The
official comment on this rule notes that it "reflects the general obligation of a lawyer
• . . to respect the rights of third persons." This proposal is still under consideration by
the New Hampshire Supreme Court. N.H. Bar Ass'n, Proposed Amendment of Rule
3.8 of the N.H. Rules of Professional Conduct (June 1986).
The House of Delegates of the New York State Bar Association unanimously
adopted, in January 1986, a broad attorney-subpoena proposal similar to the resolution
adopted by the American Bar Association. The New York proposal was considered by
the Jones Committee, which was established by the New York State Bar Association to
examine the proposed Code of Professional Responsibility. The Jones Committee de-
clined to adopt the proposal but instead invited comment on it. In June 1987, the
House of Delegates adopted a substitute proposal that was similar to PF 15 but with
two exceptions: the substitute proposal covers both present and past representation and
it requires notice to the attorney and client. This proposal was passed by an over-
whelming majority and submitted to the various Appellate Divisions of the State of
New York for adoption. No action has yet been taken on the proposal. House of Dele-
gates, N.Y. Bar Ass'n, Proposed Rule of Professional Responsibility DR 7-103(c)
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These rules and proposals are an important step in the direction of
regulating the use of attorney subpoenas. However, they do not provide
adequate client protection for several reasons. First, it is unclear
whether a violation of these rules can be invoked by the attorney or the
client as a bar to enforcement of the subpoena. In Klubock, the First
Circuit emphatically rejected such a use for PF 15.194 If an attorney
subpoena rule can only be enforced by means of disciplinary proceed-
ings, which may occur, if at all, long after the attorney's appearance
before the grand jury has been compelled, the very harm which the rule
seeks to prevent will have already occurred.
Another concern is that unless the federal district courts adopt the
same rules as the states in which they sit, there may be a question as to
whether federal prosecutors will be bound by the state rule. Although
this objection to the enforcement of PF 15 was rejected by the district




In Pennsylvania the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania is
considering a proposal somewhat broader than PF 15 in that it would apply to grand
juries or "other tribunal[s] investigating criminal activity" and covers both present and
past representation. Proposed Rule 3.10, Pennsylvania Bulletin, Volume 18, No. 1, at
10 (Jan. 2, 1988).
19" See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 657 (1st Cir.) (stating that
"[a]ttorneys are not, by virtue of such status, exempt from answering to subpoenas
when properly served, including even when compliance has not been made with provi-
sions such as PF 15."), vacated, United States v. Klubock, No. 86-1413 (1st Cir. May
1, 1987) (order granting rehearing en banc, which withdrew the panel's opinion and
vacated its judgment); see also United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 664, 665 (1st Cir.
1987) (en banc) (stating that the three judges voting to affirm the district court's deci-
sion also "abide by the majority panel opinion"); supra note * (explaining that the half
of the en banc court that voted to affirm the district court's decision also adopted the
vacated majority panel opinion). Such a limitation would, presumably, not apply to a
procedural rule, such as Virginia's Rule 3A:12.
195 639 F. Supp. 117, 125-26 (D. Mass. 1986).
198 Klubock, 832 F.2d at 651-52. During the Klubock litigation, PF 15 was ex-
plicitly adopted as a local rule by the federal district court for the District of Massa-
chusetts while the Justice Department's action to enjoin enforcement of PF 15 against
federal prosecutors was pending before the First Circuit. Until that explicit adoption
occurred, the Department of Justice had advanced two major arguments.
First, the Department of Justice argued that PF 15, if incorporated by the district
court's local rules, was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 and
therefore invalidated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57, which permits the
promulgation of local rules "not inconsistent with" the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure. Klubock, 639 F. Supp. at 121. The district court held, however, that Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17's criteria for the issuance of subpoenas were not incon-
sistent with PF 15's requirement of judicial approval prior to service. Id. at 122.
Second, the Department of Justice argued that, if PF 15 was not incorporated by
the district court's local rules, "PF 15 offends the Supremacy Clause because it inter-
feres with [the duties of] federal officers . . . ." Id. at 125. The district court found no
conflict between federal and state law and rejected this argument, id. at 126, explicitly
1988]
1824 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Likewise, several of the state rules and proposals require only ex
parte proceedings for prior judicial approval of attorney subpoenas. In
those states, where neither the attorney nor the client has an opportu-
nity to be heard, the attorney may be forced to appear before the grand
jury and assert behind closed doors whatever privileges may be availa-
ble. Lack of notice to the client may create a situation in which the
attorney fails to assert relevant privileges.19
Finally, while there is considerable value in the experience that
states may acquire in their role as laboratories, the attorney subpoena
problem is national in scope and in significance. The solution, ulti-
mately, should be national as well.
III. PROPOSALS FOR THE REGULATION OF ATTORNEY SUBPOENAS
A. The Policies at Stake
Assessment of the attorney subpoena problem requires some initial
consideration of the unique and important interests at stake. The roles
of the attorney and the attorney-client relationship are, of course, cen-
tral to our adversary system. 98 At the same time, one cannot gainsay
the importance of the job entrusted to prosecutors and the grand
jury-namely, ferreting out crime. In balancing these two sets of inter-
ests, it is obvious that we cannot afford to sacrifice wholly one set for
the other.' 99
reserving the issue of whether the local rules of the district court had adopted PF 15.
Id. at 121. The supremacy clause argument was considered moot by the Court of Ap-
peals and so never decided at that level. Klubock, 832 F.2d at 651-52.
1"7 Although the attorney is duty bound to assert such privileges, it appears that
attorneys are ignoring this obligation on a fairly regular basis. Interestingly, the De-
partment of Justice has stated that it would not object to a rule that required a subpoe-
naed attorney to appear before a judge and verify that she had discussed the subpoena
with her client. See Reply Brief of Department of Justice at 20 n. 15 United States v.
Klubock, 86-1413 (1st Cir. 1987) (Brief filed on September 2, 1986) (noting that the
Justice Department "would have no quarrel with such a rule pursuant to the court's
supervisory power over the grand jury, subpoenas, or attorney conduct").
198 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring)
("the lawyer and the law office are indispensable parts of our administration of jus-
tice" (emphasis added); United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1355 (9th
Cir. 1977) (stating that the "attorney-client privilege is central to the legal system and
the adversary process"); In re Terkeltoub, 256 F. Supp. 683, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(discussing the importance of the attorney-client privilege to the client, the interests of
the community, and the welfare of the legal system).
199 Recent experience has required more aggressive prosecution of society's
fight against the mounting evils of crime. We commend both vigorous
prosecution and all legitimate means in aid of this laudable task. This,
however, does not mean that society can afford a 'no holds barred' ap-




1. The Role of the Attorney and the Attorney-Client Relationship
The centrality of the attorney-client relationship in our criminal
justice and adversary systems derives from both constitutional and com-
mon law sources. As the oldest common law privilege, the attorney-
client privilege predates our Revolution 0 and provides one of the basic
foundations of our judicial system. The right to counsel is, of course,
enshrined in the sixth amendment and in nearly every state constitu-
tion, as well as in the jurisprudence of constitutional due process under
the fifth and fourteenth amendments.20 1
Although the importance of the attorney-client relationship finds
its expression in particular forms - such as ethical rules protecting the
client's secrets and confidences, constitutional doctrines concerning the
right to effective assistance of counsel, common law attorney-client priv-
ilege, and, more recently, attorney work-product privilege - the whole
amounts to something greater than its parts. In other words, the rights
associated with the attorney-client relationship are not simply an im-
portant collection of separate, legally protected interests which our sys-
tem recognizes - a set of tubs, as it were, each sitting on its own
bottom. Rather, these rights derive their significance and justification to
some degree from each other and from the fact that, together, they form
one of the cornerstones on which our adversary system has been built.
The recent efforts to chip away at the legal principles on which the
attorney-client relationship depends - as in the area of attorney-client
privilege, for example - thus erode one of the basic components of our
legal system.
The attorney-client relationship is even more vital today than in
the past. Our laws and our legal system have grown so increasingly
complex that "the individual lack[s] the requisite skill to handle his or
her legal affairs."20 2 The nonlawyer who enters the bewildering thicket
of laws presently on the books in the United States without counsel
clearly does so at her peril.
Klubock, 832 F.2d at 658.
200 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2290 (noting that attorney-client privi-
lege was considered "unquestioned" as long ago as the sixteenth century).
201 See C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHIcs 791-94 (1986) (reviewing consti-
tutional bases for the right to counsel). The right to counsel is guaranteed by state
constitutional provisions in every state except Virginia, where the right to counsel is
established by statute. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-157 (1983).
202 Rosenfeld, supra note 103, at 512; see Upjohn Co. v. United States,, 449 U.S.
383, 392-93 (1981) (discussing need for corporations to be able to consult counsel in
order to comply with the law); Potashnik v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101,
1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1976) and
stressing need for criminal defendant to be able to communicate with counsel in order
to understand trial proceedings).
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Further, this century has witnessed a virtual explosion of federal
and state regulatory provisions which establish criminal penalties.20 3
Some of these statutes, such as RICO,20 4 criminalize conduct which as
isolated behavior would be lawful.20 5 The proliferation of criminal laws
in formerly white collar enclaves206 creates an even greater need for
legal representation, since the individual's liberty, as well as her prop-
erty, are in jeopardy.
Technological and legal developments have also greatly increased
the power of the government to investigate and prosecute individuals.
20 7
In this new legal climate, an unrepresented criminal defendant or in-
vestigation target is particularly helpless.
These developments underscore some of the reasons why our soci-
ety places such a high value on the fundamental right to the assistance
of an attorney, including the right to conduct the attorney-client rela-
tionship in a confidential manner. Among the most important of those
reasons is society's goal of conforming its citizens' conduct to the law.
Because of the increasing complexity of the law, individuals, corpora-
tions, and other entities more frequently need to consult and confide in
attorneys in order to determine whether their conduct is lawful.20 8
Lawyers thus play a vital role in translating the law into a vernacular
that their clients understand.
The attorney-client relationship also facilitates the truth-finding
process that our courts and other dispute-resolution institutions per-
form. Two of the premises of our adversary system are (1) that the
truth-finding process will be more reliable if each side advocates its
position with zeal, 209 and (2) that an attorney will be better able to
advocate her client's case if she has the fullest opportunity to assemble
20" See generally Fried, supra note 17, at 471 (noting criminal penalties for viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, Securities Act of 1933, Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,
various tax laws, environmental laws, and laws designed to punish organized crime,
such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")).
204 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
200 See Fried, supra note 17, at 471-72.
206 One commentator notes, for example, the existence of more than one hundred
federal statutes prohibiting false statements to the Government. Id. at 477.
207 See Rosenfeld, supra note 103, at 512; see, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (permitting police to make warrantless aerial observations by
plane); 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (granting authorization for inter-
ception of wire or oral communication).
208 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981) (noting that
compliance with "vast and complicated array of regulatory legislation . . . is hardly an
instinctive matter" (citations omitted)).
200 See C. WOLFRAM, supra note 201, at 581-82 ("ITihe best method of resolving
disputes is single-minded representation by client-centered advocates who, in their zeal




the relevant facts about her client without fear that she will be forced to
disclose information potentially harmful to the client.210
In addition, we rely on the attorney's advocacy on behalf of the
client to vindicate the client's rights.2" In a legal system such as ours,
where the norms are defined in terms of "rights" and "duties" and
where the legitimacy of the system depends in large measure on the
extent to which individuals' fundamental rights are given equal consid-
eration, it is essential that each individual have a loyal advocate who
can work independently of any control by the individual's opponent.
2 12
Finally, there are non-instrumental reasons for the special impor-
tance we ascribe to the attorney-client relationship - namely, the indi-
vidual's interest in privacy, dignity, autonomy, and protection. 1 In
this respect, the attorney's relationship with the client is similar to
other important privileged relationships which our legal system protects
from intrusion and interference, such as those between husband and
wife, priest and penitent, and psychiatrist and patient. The client, who
may regard her attorney as a trusted ally or friend, certainly expects
that she can speak to the attorney with candor and may value that
relationship as highly as those which we ordinarily regard as entitled to
a guarantee of complete confidentiality.21
2. The Role of the Grand Jury
Although grand juries are not the only forum in which the attor-
ney can be compelled to testify, the broad powers of the grand jury and
the secrecy of its proceedings make its unique role in the attorney sub-
poena controversy worthy of special attention. Like the attorney-client
privilege, the grand jury has its roots in the legal tradition that we
inherited from England.215 The framers of the Constitution and the
Bill of Rights considered the grand jury to be such an important safe-
guard from oppression that they included it in the fifth amendment as a
210 See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (noting that the "law-
yer-client privilege rests on the need for the advocate and counselor to know all that
relates to the client's reasons for seeking representation if the professional mission is to
be carried out"); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("The purpose of
the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys.").
211 See Rosenfeld, supra note 103, at 505-06.
212 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
213 For a useful discussion of the utilitarian and non-utilitarian justifications for
privilege, see Developments in the Law, supra note 65, at 1501-07.
214 See generally Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the
Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060, 1071 (1976) (analogizing a lawyer to a
friend in that she acts not in her own, but in her client's interest).
215 See 1 W. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (discussing history of grand
jury).
19881 1827
1828 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
governmental body designed to be independent of both the prosecutor
and the courts.2 16 The grand jury's dual purpose was "to discover and
present for trial persons suspected of criminal wrongdoing and [to pro-
tect] citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action.
211
In recent years, however, both the grand jury's independence and
its role as a "protector" of individuals have been questioned more
closely. Critics have pointed out that grand juries seldom act indepen-
dently of prosecutors. As the ABA noted in its 1982 report on the grand
jury, "[w]hile the grand jury was enshrined in our Constitution because
of its reputed ability to protect the innocent from unfounded prosecu-
tion, few scholars or practitioners takes [sic] its accusatorial function
seriously today."21 Thus, as a Justice Department official conceded,
"the grand jury does not operate to protect the individual to any sub-
stantial degree."21
Today, no longer an independent institution, the grand jury serves
as a powerful adjunct to prosecutors' law enforcement efforts within
their respective districts. The grand jury is useful to the government
because, unlike the prosecutor, the grand jury can compel the appear-
ance of witnesses and require them to testify (by giving them immunity
if necessary). Witnesses resisting the grand jury's compulsion may be
held in contempt and imprisoned.220 In addition, grand jury proceed-
218 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.) (The grand jury is
an independent body that is "not relegated by the Constitution to a position within any
of the three branches of the government."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
217 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
218 ABA, Grand Jury Policy and Model Act (1977-1982) 20 (1982) [hereinafter
ABA Report II]. The ABA Report cites statistics showing that in one year federal
grand juries returned approximately 23,000 indictments and reported only 123 no true
bills. See id. at 27 n.5; see also EMERSON, GRAND JURY REFORM: A REVIEW OF KEY
ISSUES 21 (U.S. Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, January, 1983)
(reporting study showing that grand jurors discussed only 20% of the cases before vot-
ing on them, and returned 95% of the indictments sought by the prosecutor); Campbell,
Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 174 (1973) ("Today,
the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he is candid, will concede
that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any grand jury.');
Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1268 (1976) (noting "evolution of the grand jury
from a more or less independent institution to an institution completely dominated by
the prosecutor"); cf. T. 'WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 603 (1987) (quoting
New York Court of Appeals Chief Judge Wachtler as saying that "a grand jury would
'indict a ham sandwich,' if that's what [the prosecutor] wanted"). Significantly, many
states have eliminated the grand jury from their own criminal justice systems. See S.
BEALE & W. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 2.03, 2.04 (1986).
211 120 CONG. REC. 38,292-94 (1974) (letter from Assistant Attorney General W.
Vincent Rakestraw to Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Representative
Peter W. Rodino Jr.).
220 See W. LAFAVE, supra note 215, § 8.3 ("The grand jury may utilize the
subpoena duces tecum to obtain tangible evidence and the subpoena ad testificandum to
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ings are not limited by the strictures of "relevance" or the ordinary
exclusionary rules that apply at trial.221 A grand jury can cast its sub-
poenas far and wide and is generally entitled to "every man's evi-
dence." '222 In general, the witness has no right to demand any showing
of "cause" for issuance of the subpoena.2 23 The secrecy with which
grand jury proceedings are conducted 224 also contributes to their coer-
cive atmosphere.225 This particular combination of extraordinary pow-
ers, secrecy, and minimal limitations on the evidence that it may hear
has resulted, according to the ABA, in "a gross imbalance. . . between
the awesome powers of the government acting through the . . . grand
jury, on the one hand and the limited rights of the grand jury witness,
on the other.
226
B. A Balancing Act:
Four Proposals for Regulation of Attorney Subpoenas
An appropriate balance must be struck between the two interests
arrayed against one another in the attorney subpoena setting. Indeed,
on one fundamental point, both the Justice Department and its critics
agree: attorney subpoenas are not to be resorted to casually; there must
be a concrete reason, of sufficient weight to justify the likely disruption
of the attorney's relationship with her client. This much is implicit in
the Department's Guidelines.227 There are, of course, differences of
opinion both on what constitutes a satisfactory reason for issuing the
subpoena and on who should decide that question. There is no real
obtain testimony. Both subpoenas are supported by the court's authority to hold in
contempt any person who willfully refuses, without legal justification, to comply with a
subpoena's directive." (footnote omitted)).
221 See Note, supra note 51, at 570 & n.186.
222 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972); see United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1972).
22 But see supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of pre-
liminary showing for enforcement of grand jury subpoenas in Third and Tenth
Circuits).
224 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e) (setting forth the general rule forbidding partici-
pants in the federal grand jury process from disclosing matters occurring before the
grand jury).
225 To be sure, the attorney may be better equipped than a nonlawyer to resist the
pressures that can be brought to bear on her behind the closed doors of the grand jury
room. Yet, as noted above, the attorney also has to deal with the very realistic fear that
resisting the grand jury subpoena and litigating its validity will be costly in terms of
her professional reputation and because of the diversion of time which such litigation
involves. In addition, the attorney may fear that those who learn of the grand jury's
interest in her may not know whether she was a prospective witness or target.
228 ABA Report II, supra note 218, at 20 & n.8 (quoting 34 Rec. A. B. City N.Y.,
219, 224 (1979).
27 See supra notes 170-82 and accompanying text (discussing Guidelines).
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dispute, however, on the most crucial point - that the usual "fishing
expedition" power of the grand jury to cast a broad and speculative net
is out of place when it comes to subpoenaing attorneys for information
about their clients.
How are we to reconcile these interests in any given case? Cur-
rently, the law is unbalanced. There are very few enforceable rights
that can be asserted to prevent a determined prosecutor from finding a
basis for compelling evidence from the attorney. But a regime that
grants prosecutors the virtually uninhibited power to destabilize or de-
stroy the legal representation of an adversary, by the simple means of a
well-aimed subpoena, is inconsistent with fundamental tenets of our le-
gal system, the fairness of which depends, in large measure, on the
zealous advocacy of counsel for the individual.
This Article, therefore, proposes four measures designed to restore
a balance to the competing interests of the prosecution and grand jury
on the one hand and the attorney-client relationship on the other. If
adopted, these proposals would lead to results more consistent with the
relevant policy considerations. 2 The first two of these measures are
primarily procedural reforms; the last two would add to existing privi-
leges to cover some of the gaps through which prosecutors have reached
in order to use the attorney as a witness against her client.
Our proposals are the following. First, every subpoena should be
subject to judicial review to establish that it is needed. Second, judicial
review should take place prior to issuance of an attorney subpoena in
every case. Third, an attorney should be protected from compelled dis-
closure of any information that she acquired in the course of the repre-
sentation and that would incriminate the client. Fourth, certain infor-
mation that the attorney acquires as a result of the representation
should be immune to compulsory process during the course of ongoing
representation.2 The proposed privileges (i.e., proposals three and
four) overlap both each other and existing protections. They could be
implemented by judicial reconsideration of the limitations of existing
privileges, or by means of common law development.2 " Any of the four
proposals could, of course, be implemented by rulemaking or
22 The four reforms have much in common with a model attorney subpoena rule,
developed by the National Network for the Right to Counsel ("NNRC"), set out in
Appendix B of this Article. These reforms could either function as part of a single
rulemaking or legislative package, or stand alone and be individually justified by sepa-
rate and overlapping sources of law. The authors of this Article are actively involved in
the NNRC and participated in the drafting of the NNRC proposal.
22 These last two proposals would be subject to exceptions in certain limited cir-
cumstances. See infra text accompanying notes 287-93, 300-03.




1. Judicial Review For Necessity
There is little controversy as to whether there should be some de-
termination of the need for evidence before an attorney subpoena is
approved. Without such review, a prosecutor's demand for the most
cumulative, unnecessary and easily found piece of evidence might result
in the dismissal of a party's lawyer, or in other undesirable conse-
quences.231 Indeed, even the Department of Justice Guidelines explic-
itly recognize that "the information sought [should be] reasonably
needed for the successful completion of the investigation or prosecu-
tion, '232 and that "[a]ll reasonable attempts to obtain the information
from alternative sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful. 233 The
Department contends, however, that the determination must be made
unilaterally by the government and should not be committed in any
way to judicial review.
Entrusting the attorney-client relationship to the prosecutor, an
adversary with a strong interest in the outcome of the underlying con-
troversy, is not a reliable method of safeguarding that relationship.
Even in the best of circumstances, the prosecutor is unlikely to weigh
the various interests in an unbiased manner. And, as noted above, for
these and other reasons the Justice Department Guidelines have failed
to effectively control the proliferation of attorney subpoenas.234
Opponents of judicial review argue that a required showing of
need is contrary to (1) the traditional right of the prosecutor to choose
what evidence to produce and (2) the power of the grand jury to obtain
every person's evidence without any showing of cause.23 5 They point to
the absence of broader protection under the attorney-client privilege as
evidence of a policy not to impede the search for truth by blocking the
grand jury's access to an attorney's testimony. Some suggest that judi-
cial review would be too cumbersome and difficult to administer.236
However, the absence in current law of a general requirement of
231 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text (discussing the problems asso-
ciated with attorney subpoenas).
232 GUIDELINES, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a)(F)(1).
233 Id. § 9-2.161(a)(F)(3).
234 See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
235 See United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649, 663 (1st Cir. 1987) (Campbell,
C.J., dissenting) (arguing that requiring a showing of need before subpoenaing attor-
neys would be contrary to the traditional functioning of the grand jury).
236 See In re Klein, 776 F.2d 628, 632 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting further that the
question of "[h]ow much information is 'enough' is a matter for the judgment of the
grand jurors and the prosecutors rather than the courts").
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judicial review seems explicable more as a function of history and a
lack of an occasion for its development than as a policy decision that the
requirement should not be imposed. Until recently, attorney subpoenas
were almost non-existent and there was no general government policy
supporting their use. Indeed, what considered policy there was favored
protection of the attorney-client relationship. For example, federal law
has recognized that common law privileges designed to protect the at-
torney-client relationship should be enforced even in the grand jury,
23 7
where the exclusionary rule does not apply238 and where other relation-
ships and interests do not enjoy similar protection.23 9
Moreover, as a historical matter, the development of privilege pro-
tection has occurred primarily in response to new means of forcing dis-
closure of evidence. The attorney-client privilege first arose in direct
response to the development of compulsory process for testimony.240
The need for the work-product privilege did not come about until the
adoption of pre-trial discovery methods exposed the attorney's materials
to compulsory disclosure.24' Now that a new need for protection of the
attorney-client relationship has arisen, the fact that a proposal has not
been adopted before should not be grounds for its rejection. Indeed, the
Federal Rules of Evidence grant explicit power to the federal courts to
develop new privileges where appropriate. 42 Courts have exercised this
power, at times in support of interests arguably much less weighty than
the attorney-client relationship.243
Judicial screening for necessity is hardly unprecedented.244 It oc-
137 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400-02 (1981).
'38 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
211 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (rejecting claim of Presi-
dential privilege by sitting President, but noting that "generally, an attorney ... may
not be required to disclose what has been revealed in professional confidence");
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (rejecting proposed newsman's privilege
but contrasting "those persons protected by a constitutional, common-law, or statutory
privilege").
240 See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 49, § 2290.
241 See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
242 See FED. R. EvID. 501.
243 E.g., United States v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980, 1002 (1st Cir. 1987) (finding a
qualified privilege against government disclosure of "sensitive" electronic investigative
techniques, because information disclosure "will enable criminals to frustrate future
government surveillance and perhaps unduly jeopardize the security of ongoing investi-
gations," (emphasis added)); United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1507-08 (11 th
Cir.) (holding that a privilege applies to the nature and location of electronic surveil-
lance equipment but gives way if a need for the information is shown) cert. denied, 107
S.Ct. 190 (1986); United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677 F.2d 211, 219-21 (2d Cir.
1982) (finding an accountants' work-product privilege), affd in part, rev'd in part,
465 U.S. 805 (1984).
244 See, e.g., United States v. Crockett, 506 F.2d 759, 760-61 (5th Cir.) ("As a
general rule, a party's attorney should not be called as a witness unless his testimony is
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curs routinely, particularly in the grand jury context, whenever the
subpoena calls for material subject to the qualified protection applicable
to work product.24 It also forms part of the analysis employed by a
court in considering, under Rule 17, whether an apparently burden-
some or irregular subpoena is justified.24 Moreover, there is nothing
about the process of criminal investigation that is so mysterious that a
prosecutor could not explain the need for an item of evidence. Indeed,
the Justice Department Guidelines require the prosecutor requesting
the subpoena to offer just such an explanation. 47 As a practical matter,
if the prosecutor cannot demonstrate need, it is reasonable to presume
either that it does not exist or that it does not outweigh countervailing
interests.
Our proposal requires the government to carry the burden of mak-
ing a clear and convincing demonstration to a judicial officer that the
evidence sought is necessary at that time to the continued viability of a
legitimate investigation or prosecution, and that all attempts to obtain
the evidence from non-attorney sources have proved fruitless. An im-
portant requirement of the proposal is the showing of present need,
which must be evaluated within the context of the countervailing inter-
ests of the attorney and client. Thus, if the subpoena would interfere
with an ongoing representation and if the need for the evidence can be
deferred until a later stage of the investigation or litigation, thereby
minimizing disruption to the attorney-client relationship, approval of
the subpoena should be denied.248 Another important element of our
proposal is that the government must demonstrate cause to believe that
the attorney possesses specific evidence needed by the prosecution.
Mere speculation as to types of evidence which might aid the prosecu-
tor if held by defense counsel should not justify compelling her
both necessary and unobtainable from other sources." (emphasis added) (citations
omitted)), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1975).
245 See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 397-402 (1981).
248 See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
247 See Guidelines, supra note 170, § 9-2.161(a)(F).
248 For an example in the grand jury context, see In re Grand Jury Matters
(Hodes and Gordon), 751 F.2d 13, 18-20 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming district court's
decision to quash subpoenas but preserving the "government's right to renew the sub-
poenas at a more suitable moment or upon a more substantial showing of immediate
urgency and need").
Similarly, with respect to trial testimony, even if the government can show that the
viability of a prosecution hinges upon the testimony sought, the subpoena should be
denied if the testimony can be postponed and the delay would minimize disruption to
the relationship. In practice, a trial can be postponed, or, if the evidence is admissible
on less than all counts of an indictment, the counts that do not require the attorney's
testimony could be severed and tried first so that the attorney's testimony would not
become necessary until the remaining counts are ready for trial.
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testimony.
The practical effect of this proposal would be to shift the initial
burden from the attorney (who, now, must challenge an objectionable
subpoena) to the government (which, under our proposal, would have
to justify subpoenaing the attorney). Of course, placing the initial bur-
den upon the prosecutor's shoulders need not be dispositive of the out-
come. As in the Rule 17 context, courts would consider the need for the
subpoena in light of a number of relevant factors, such as unavailability
of the information from alternative sources.
2. Pre-Issuance Judicial Review
We propose that judicial review take place prior to issuance of the
subpoena, for two important reasons: first, such a procedure ensures
that every case receives judicial review; second, and perhaps more im-
portant, the procedure will have a "self-regulatory" effect on potential
prosecutorial overreaching. Current practice permits an unscrupulous
prosecutor to take advantage of a frightened or compromised attorney
by using an obviously invalid subpoena as a pretext for obtaining the
disclosure of privileged information, since the prosecutor knows that the
attorney will not challenge the subpoena and that the matter will be
reviewed by neither court nor client. Advance judicial review would
eliminate such sub rosa use of attorney subpoenas, and thus diminish
the incentive for abuse.
The best procedure for judicial review would provide for a single
adversary hearing, prior to issuance of the subpoena, with notice to
both the attorney and her client.24 This procedure guarantees judicial
review in all cases and it minimizes the risk of attorney disloyalty. An-
other method is that employed in the District of Massachusetts,
250
where there is an ex parte proceeding to determine whether the sub-
poena should be served on the attorney, who can (if the subpoena is
served) nevertheless file a motion to quash. Since preliminary review is
ex parte, the focus is necessarily on the clearly abusive subpoena. The
Massachusetts procedure thus guarantees some judicial review in all
cases, but is a less effective screen for attorney disloyalty than a con-
tested preliminary review.
The government argues that any pre-issuance review will cause
the very type of unacceptable delay in grand jury investigations which
concerned the Supreme Court when it condemned the notion of "mini-
249 See supra note 197 (noting Justice Department's approval of rule that would
require showing that client had been notified of the attorney subpoena).
2 0 See supra notes 134-35 & 184 and accompanying text (discussing PF 15).
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trials" for all grand jury subpoenas.251 In practice this need not be so.
The Massachusetts ex parte procedure under PF 15 involves no more
delay than that necessary to obtain a search warrant. PF 15 has now
been in operation for over two years in Massachusetts, with no re-
ported problems.
A pre-issuance adversary procedure would create some delay prior
to issuance. Such a review, however, could supplant the motion to
quash and could require both the client and witness to consolidate all
grounds that could otherwise be raised at the motion to quash stage at
this pre-issuance hearing.2"2 In this way, the only delay caused by the
rule that is not already entailed by current practice would be that cre-
ated by conducting hearings where attorneys do not now file motions to
quash. This is a reasonable price to pay to ensure that attorneys ade-
quately protect the rights of their clients, especially in light of the evi-
dence that they do not invariably do so.25
3. A "Non-Incrimination" Privilege
Under our third proposed reform, the attorney would be protected
at all times from compelled disclosure of information acquired in con-
nection with representation of her client if that information would in-
criminate the client. This type of privilege is necessary in order to ef-
fectuate fully the well-recognized policies of encouraging persons to
consult, retain, and confide in attorneys,25 to entrust counsel with ple-
nary power to investigate their cases, 255 and to encourage the attorney
to make a thorough investigation as part of the duty of providing "ef-
fective" assistance.256 As noted above, currently recognized privileges
are riddled with loopholes and qualifications; without this proposed
new protection, a client who retains and confides in an attorney as-
sumes the risk that information accumulated by the lawyer will be used
to incriminate her, and a lawyer who conducts an investigation may
find herself forced to disclose evidence ensuring her client's conviction.
Indeed, without protection beyond that afforded by current law, contin-
uation of present government subpoena practices may lead to significant
changes in both client and attorney behavior. Without the type of "non-
251 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973).
252 The NNRC proposal does consolidate these two stages in one proceeding. See
Appendix B §§ 4-5.
223 See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
25 See supra notes 200-14 and accompanying text.
255 See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947).
2 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (citing McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
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incrimination" privilege proposed here, a reasonable client would be
extremely reluctant to share with her lawyer sensitive information or
documents that could possibly fall outside the boundaries of any cur-
rently recognized privilege.
Similarly, forcing the attorney to provide evidence against her cli-
ent creates severe impediments to the performance of her professional
role. The cautious attorney would avoid acquiring any more informa-
tion than she believed could be safely withheld from disclosure. This
type of self-censorship by attorneys could result in the same sort of
demoralization of lawyers and degradation of legal practice that the Su-
preme Court warned against in Hickman. Moreover, the attorney is
ethically bound to maintain undivided loyalty to her client and to pre-
serve the confidentiality of all client information.2 57 The contradiction
between these obligations and the duty to produce evidence at the re-
quest of the government creates a dilemma for the practitioner who
must encourage and maintain the client's continuing trust.
Furthermore, even when a client is not deterred from entrusting
her attorney with information, turning the attorney into a government
informant clearly violates our most fundamental notions of justice and
fair play. This is especially apparent in criminal cases, where the need
for representation arises from government action in the form of investi-
gation or prosecution, and where the law sanctions, encourages, and in
most cases, guarantees resort to counsel. Unfairness is particularly ap-
parent if the government can reap the very information collected by the
lawyer in the effort to defend the client against the government action.
In Doyle v. Ohio258 the Supreme Court found a due process viola-
tion in a similar sort of duplicity. There, the Court faced the issue of
the admissibility at trial of a defendant's post-arrest silence, which the
prosecution sought to use against the defendant for purposes of im-
peaching his credibility. The Court noted that the defendant had been
given the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona,25 which informs
detainees of their rights to remain silent and to demand counsel and
which, therefore, implicitly encourages the detainee to believe that no
penalty would be exacted for the exercise of those rights. Violation of
that implicit assurance, the Court held, constituted a due process
violation:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no ex-
press assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such as-
157 See supra note 25.
258 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
259 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
[Vol. 136:1783
ATTORNEY-SUBPOENA PROBLEM
surance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings.
In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and
a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's
silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently
offered at trial.260
Similar reasoning applies when the government gives the individual a
right to consult with counsel, then creates the need for the consultation
by its own actions, and finally, exploits the individual's exercise of that
right to undo her.
Subject to a few narrow exceptions, 261 our proposal would elevate
to the same privileged status as attorney-client communications all in-
formation acquired solely as a result of counsel's representation, if the
information would tend to incriminate the client.262
A "non-incrimination" privilege serves several important purposes.
First, the client would be assured that she can safely retain, consult
with, and confide in her attorney without fear that her revelations and
the information accumulated by the attorney might be used to incrimi-
nate her. Second, the attorney would be assured that she may safely
260 426 U.S. at 618. The Court has found constitutional violations in situations
analogous to that in Doyle. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct. 634, 641
(1986) (holding that a defendant's post-Miranda-warning silence may not be used to
rebut an insanity defense); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (holding that state
could not use defendant's statements to court-appointed psychiatrist against him).
261 See infra notes 287-93 and accompanying text.
262 The proposed privilege would track the fifth amendment self-incrimination
clause in two important respects. First, it would protect information that could harm
the client only in a criminal proceeding. There are policy considerations that favor
protection of the client from being harmed in other (non-criminal) settings by informa-
tion gained by her own attorney in the course of representing her, and persuasive argu-
ments can be made that the client should have similar protection in civil as well as
criminal proceedings, particularly where the government is a party, such as in immi-
gration, civil RICO, or tax cases. However, this Article does not address the question of
whether the privilege proposed should be extended beyond the criminal context. The
most compelling case for reform rests upon the unfairness of government action in
criminal litigation and the greatest need for enhanced protection is found in that
situation.
Second, the proposed privilege would utilize the familiar fifth amendment test for
determining whether evidence tends to incriminate the client, that is, whether it fur-
nishes "a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute." Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951). Such a test is necessary because injury accrues to the attor-
ney-client relationship by the attorney's disclosure of incriminating evidence regardless
of whether the evidence provides a first or a "last link." See supra text accompanying
note 63 (discussing "last link" exception to rule permitting disclosure of client identity
and fee information). Under this test, the Government bears the burden of showing that
it is "'perfectly clear . . . that the answer[s] cannot possibly have such tendency' to
incriminate." Id. at 488 (citation omitted); see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11-12
(1964). Unless the burden is placed on the government, the client often will have to
relinquish the benefits of the privilege in order to demonstrate her right to claim it.
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investigate the matter for which she has been retained without fear that
her efforts might later harm her client. Third, the non-incrimination
privilege would have the effect of harmonizing counsel's ethical obliga-
tions with evidentiary rules, thus minimizing the dissonance and role
conflict caused by current practices. Furthermore, the privilege as de-
scribed here would not deprive the prosecution of information that
would be available absent the existence of the attorney-client relation-
ship.2"' The privilege therefore would cause no net loss in the search
for truth.
264
In addition, the non-incrimination privilege as proposed would in-
sulate precisely those categories of information that are incompletely
protected under current privilege law: client identity, information relat-
ing to fees and expenses, and work product.
a. Client Identity, Fees, and Expenses
Client identity and fee and expense information have generally
been considered unprotected by the attorney-client privilege.265 The
traditional rationale for the attorney-client privilege - i.e., encourag-
ing uninhibited client communication -- logically supports extending
protection to the client's identity. On the one hand, of course, the infor-
mation is normally obtained by means of client communication. Fur-
thermore, confidentiality is as essential to promoting the consultation
initially as it is to encouraging full disclosure during the course of the
consultation. If clients had to risk incrimination in order to consult law-
yers, they would hesitate to do so, perhaps until too late.266 A rule
which encourages communication but penalizes consultation is para-
doxical in principle and counterproductive in practice. Our proposal
would permit the lawyer to withhold the name of a client who has
consulted her for legal advice or legal services when the information
might incriminate that client.
The protection of incriminating fee information from disclosure by
the attorney is necessary to encourage individuals who need legal repre-
sentation to seek it. This is so because, notwithstanding the develop-
263 See infra text accompanying notes 289-92 (discussing exception for pre-ex-
isting material).
264 See Developments in the Law, supra note 65, at 1507-08 & n.43 (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981)).
265 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
266 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61, 63 (2d
Cir. 1984) ("[Wle would be less than candid not to concede that the lack of a privilege
against disclosure of the fact of an attorney-client relationship may discourage some
persons from seeking legal advice at all.").
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ment of the right to appointed counsel for indigent defendants,26 7 our
criminal defense representation system is still primarily a private en-
trepreneurial system. Appointed counsel is not available before indict-
ment,26 8 and, after formal charge, free counsel is available only to per-
sons who meet legal standards of indigence.2"9 White an individual has
a qualified right to retain counsel of choice,270 there is no comparable
right to choose appointed counsel.271 Moreover, government subsidies to
counsel are considerably below competitive rates,2 72 and fees and ex-
penses are subject to approval of the court,2 73 which is itself influenced
by overall budget constraints. In sum, money is an indispensable pre-
condition to the exercise of the right to retain a chosen attorney, and, in
most cases, the time and resources counsel is able to invest in the case is
directly proportional to the amount of money available.2 74 These finan-
cial concerns are an especially important defense consideration in mod-
ern, complex criminal litigation,275 which has become a highly special-
ized endeavor requiring the use of experts and a well-staffed defense
team. Preparation often entails pre-trial investigation of a wide range
of conduct allegedly committed over the course of many years.
Given the inextricable relationship of money and counsel, it is not
clear why information about fees and expenses is not accorded the same
privileged status as client communications. The rationale for protecting
attorney-client communications is the fear that without such protection
267 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) ("The right of one charged
with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in
some countries, but it is in ours.").
268 See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) ("The right to counsel
does not attach until the initiation of adversary judicial [criminal] proceedings.").
26I See Comment, Determining Eligibility for Public Defense: Constitutional Con-
flicts Posed by California Indigence Proceedings, 12 U.S.F. L. REv. 717, 720-21
(1978) (noting the requirement of indigence and the lack of consistency in federal statu-
tory and judicial standards for determining it).
270 See supra note 98 and accompanying text (discussing sixth amendment right to
counsel).
272 See Tague, An Indigent's Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 73, 79 (1974) (observing that "ja]lmost unanimously, courts have held that the
selection of counsel for an indigent is a matter within the sole discretion of the trial
court"). See generally Annotation, Indigent Accused's Right to Choose Particular
Counsel Appointed to Assist Him, 66 A.L.R.3d 996 (1975).
272 See Tague, supra note 271, at 95-96.
273 See id. at 97-98.
274 See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting
"the harsh reality that the quality of a criminal defendant's representation frequently
may turn on his ability to retain the best counsel money can buy").
275 See, e.g., United States v. Nichols, 654 F. Supp. 1541, 1559 n.23 (D. Utah
1987) ("When 28 individuals are charged with a long-term conspiracy and two are
charged with a continuing criminal enterprise, the case is necessarily complex. Not all
appointed counsel have the experience to defend such charges."), rev'd, (10th Cir.
March 10, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Courts file).
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clients will not confide in lawyers .1 7  However, the practical effect of
exposing fee arrangements is to inhibit payment of money for legal ser-
vices. Clients will find it difficult to look to friends and supporters for
help-the traditional means of marshalling resources for a criminal de-
fense-so long as contributors might be enmeshed in a grand jury in-
vestigation or embarrassed by public exposure. 2" The net result is that
obtaining counsel of choice will become more difficult, if not impossible,
for those who must rely on others for financial assistance.
Nevertheless, some courts treat the "benefactor" payment as an
evil in itself, and therefore not worthy of privilege protection,
2 78 out of
concern that the benefactor may herself be a conspirator who will influ-
ence the legal representation of the beneficiary in order to conceal her
own criminal liability. There is indeed a potential problem of conflict
of interest when an attorney's fees are paid by someone other than the
recipient of the legal services,2 7 but this risk must be weighed against
the individual's interest in obtaining adequate resources for her defense.
In general, our legal system has left it to the attorney and the informed
client to strike this balance. Of course, if the attorney violates ethical
rules governing conflicts of interest, such a violation should be remedied
in the same manner as other violations of applicable ethical rules, that
is, via bar discipline proceedings. There is nothing intrinsically im-
proper, however, in an attorney's accepting a fee from a non-client,
providing that the client consents after consultation and that there is no
interference with the lawyer's independence, her professional judgment,
or the attorney-client relationship.2"' Nor is there a prohibition on
multiple representation of clients if the lawyer believes that the repre-
sentation of each client will be unimpaired and the clients consent after
27" See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (stating that the "pur-
pose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure to their attorneys").
2177 Cf NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 308 (1964) (stating that "compelled
disclosure of the names of [NAACP members in Alabama] would entail 'the likelihood
of a substantial restraint upon the exercise by [these] members of their-right to freedom
of association.' ").
278 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoenas (Hirsch), 803 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir.
1986) ("The attorney-client relationship is not genuine where its only purpose is to
gain confidentiality for the client or to use the lawyer as a mere conduit for the pay-
ment of money."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum (Shargel), 742 F.2d 61,
64 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that the attorney-client privilege does not shield benefactor
payments).
29 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8() (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(A) (1980).
280 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(f) (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(A)(1) (1980); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 320 (1968) (The "mere fact that





Moreover, the professional criminal organization will not, in the
long run, be harmed by attorneys' testimony about fee arrangements:
the sophisticated criminal will have little difficulty structuring financial
transactions to insulate the lawyer from forbidden knowledge. On the
contrary, the principal casualties of exposure will be ordinary citizens
who, in the past, have relied on the generosity of friends, relatives, de-
fense funds, and the like.
In short, there are compelling reasons for treating client identity
and fee and expense information as privileged to the same extent as
attorney-client communications. Nevertheless, we propose here only a
more modest reform, which protects the attorney from being forced to
testify about only those facts or communications that would incriminate
her client.
b. Work Product
An additional type of information that needs increased protection
is attorney work product. Currently, work product is protected by only
a qualified privilege, and is subject to disclosure upon the government's
showing of adequate need. We submit, however, that in a criminal
matter, absent extraordinary circumstances of the kind discussed be-
low,282 no showing of need should ever be deemed adequate if the in-
formation sought was lawfully acquired 8. by the lawyer as a result of
a present, or a substantially related, representation and would incrimi-
nate the client if disclosed. Protection of such information is particu-
larly necessary in the criminal defense setting because, as the Supreme
Court has noted, the role of the work-product doctrine in "assuring the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system is even more vital"
than in the civil litigation context.284 The criminal defense lawyer, for
example, generally obtains confidential information about the client or
the case which the government cannot, or does not, obtain on its own. It
would be especially unfair for the government to gain access to incrimi-
nating evidence solely because the defendant, in the face of a govern-
ment investigation or prosecution, exercised her constitutional right to
281 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1987); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(C) (1980).
282 See infra notes 287-303 and accompanying text (discussing limited situations
in which the non-incrimination privilege should give way).
283 Our proposal would allow an exception to the privilege in certain circum-
stances when the lawyer's prior services were used in the commission of a crime. See
infra text accompanying note 293.
284 United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975).
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counsel.285 The criminal defense has no burden of turning incrimina-
tory information over to the government comparable to the duty of the
prosecution to disclose exculpatory information to the defense.28 Thus,
the government's "need" for work product accumulated as part of a
criminal defense arises in a context entirely different from that of civil
litigation. It is arguable, therefore, that whenever the information is
collected as part of a criminal representation, it should be protected by
an unqualified privilege.
Once again, however, the "non-incrimination" privilege we pro-
pose here is more limited: it would require that the work-product privi-
lege be absolute only when the work product from an ongoing, or sub-
stantially related, matter would incriminate the client.
c. Exceptions
The "non-incrimination" privilege urged here should give way to
the government's demand for evidence in some limited situations -
namely, where the government has a strong need and no legitimate in-
terest of the client is threatened.
(i) "Use Immunity"
If the attorney's testimony cannot possibly harm the client in any
criminal proceeding, then the concerns on which the privilege is pre-
mised are satisfied and the privilege proposed here should give way."8 7
The government can remove the threat of harm to the client simply by
guaranteeing that the information will not be used against the client.
Thus a "non-incrimination" privilege would give way whenever the
government makes a binding commitment of "use plus fruits" immu-
nity, under which the evidence could not be used by the government
either directly or indirectly against the client.288
(ii) Pre-existing Materials
Occasionally, the attorney's investigation turns up certain unique
items which (1) existed prior to the inception bf the representation, (2)
were thus in no way generated by the representation, and (3) are in no
285 See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
28 See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 258-59 (1967) (White, J., dissent-
ing); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1962)
28 See supra note 9 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 29.
288 Cf Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443-47 (1972) (testimony may be
compelled from an unwilling witness over a claim of privilege against self-incrimination
by a grant of use and derivative use immunity).
[Vol. 136:1783
ATTORNEY-SUBPOENA PROBLEM
other way privileged. Examples are instrumentalities and fruits of
criminal conduct, such as a murder weapon289 or stolen bank notes.2 90
No privilege excuses the lawyer from producing such materials; were it
otherwise, the defense relationship could be used as a "sanctuary" to
insulate admissible evidence from production. Our proposal would rec-
ognize a similar exception.29" Additionally, even with respect to non-
unique pre-existing materials, the government should be permitted to
obtain the evidence from the lawyer when it is obvious that the materi-
als have been transferred to the attorney for the sole purpose of
concealment.
The logic of the privilege mandates, however, that the client not be
harmed by the fact per se that the item was obtained by the prosecution
from the client's lawyer. Consistent with the current majority rule, all
reference to the attorney as source must be avoided.2 92
(iii) Criminal Conduct in the Representation
If the evidence sought was acquired by the attorney when the cli-
ent was using her services in the commission of a crime, the client
should not be able to insulate herself from incrimination solely by vir-
tue of her relationship with the attorney. We would permit the attor-
ney's testimony or work product to be elicited upon a satisfactory show-
ing that the information related to the attorney's services and those
services were utilized in the commission of a crime. The exception,
however, should be narrowly construed, in order to prevent it, like the
crime/fraud exception, from becoming the rule.293 In particular, the
government should have to make a strong showing of illegality, subject
to rebuttal, based upon reliable evidence independent of that sought
from the attorney.
4. A "Current Representation" Privilege
Our fourth proposal is to create a privilege that would immunize
from production via attorney subpoena all information relating to a le-
289 E.g., State v. Green, 493 So.2d 1178, 1182-83 (La. 1986); Commonwealth v.
Stenbach, 356 Pa. Super. 5, 16-23, 514 A.2d 114, 119-23 (1986), .
290 E.g. In re Ryder, 263 F. Supp. 360, 365-66 (E.D. Va.), affd, 381 F.2d 713,
714 (4th Cir. 1967).
291 See generally Lefstein, Incriminating Physical Evidence, the Attorney's Di-
lemma, and the Need for Rules, 64 N.C.L. REV. 897, 901-10 (1986) (reviewing cases
involving defense attorneys' obligation to turn over physical evidence).
292 See State v. Olwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 834, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964); Lefstein,
supra note 291, at 902.
293 See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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gal representation during the course of that representation. This rule is
needed to prevent undue disruption of the attorney-client relationship
during an ongoing representation and to prevent unnecessary disquali-
fication of chosen counsel. The proposed rule provides that a lawyer
may not be compelled to testify if (1) she currently represents the client
in a criminal matter,294 (2) the information sought was acquired as a
result of this or a substantially related representation, and (3) compel-
ling the testimony would create a substantial risk of disqualification of
the attorney or disruption of the attorney-client relationship in the cur-
rent representation.
Unlike the "non-incrimination" privilege, a "current representa-
tion" privilege attempts to shield the attorney-client relationship from
intrusion and interference during a particular time period, that is, dur-
ing the representation itself. By contrast, the "non-incrimination" privi-
lege would extend indefinitely but cover a somewhat narrower range of
information -- namely, those statements and documents which would
incriminate the client.295
The privilege should extend to material obtained as a result of
legal representation in substantially related matters.29 6 Otherwise, the
privilege would prove to be ineffectual in any case involving multiple
proceedings. For example, suppose an attorney represents an individual
through grand jury investigation and then on the ensuing indictment;
after indictment, the government opens a "second" grand jury investi-
gation into whether obstruction of justice was committed during the
"previous" investigation.297 The proposed current representation privi-
29 As with the non-incrimination privilege, see supra note 262 and accompanying
text, there are strong policy considerations that favor extension of a current representa-
tion privilege to civil proceedings. Yet we limit the scope of the proposal in this Article
to criminal litigation, including grand jury proceedings, where the client's interests are
the weightiest and the need for reform is most acute.
29 In practice, the privileges substantially overlap. However, there are several
areas in which the protection offered by the two would be incongruent: the "non-in-
crimination" privilege would leave open to discovery (a) statements made by the client
to the attorney which are non-privileged (perhaps because they were made in public) or
non-incriminating (such as non-incriminating client identity and fee information); (b)
non-incriminating attorney work product; and (c) any other non-incriminating docu-
ments or information acquired in the course of representing the client.
2"8 The "substantial relationship" test seems well-suited to determining whether
two representations are sufficiently interrelated to justify a presumption that compelling
information acquired from one will interfere with counsel's representation in the other.
The test is derived from that used to decide disqualification motions in conflict of inter-
est cases, in order to determine whether courts will employ a presumption that an
attorney who opposes a former client possesses confidential information obtained from
the client, which can be used to that client's detriment. See, e.g., Consolidated Theaters,
Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Management, 216 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1954); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9(a) (1987).
29 See Case No. 4, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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lege would insulate the attorney from subpoena through the "second"
representation.
Under our proposal, for both ethical and practical reasons, the
privilege would be triggered by a "substantial risk" of disruption or
disqualification. First, under the ethical rules, the attorney must with-
draw as soon as possible if there is a risk that she will be called as a
witness.2 98 Even if the government did not plan to move for her dis-
qualification, the attorney should not continue that representation. Sec-
ond, as a practical matter, the purpose of a current representation priv-
ilege would be defeated if the rule could not be invoked at the earliest
moment when there was a reasonable chance of disruption of the attor-
ney-client relationship. Surely, to wait until such disruption has al-
ready begun could fatally undermine the representation and the rela-
tionship of trust on which it depends.299
The "current representation" privilege would be subject to excep-
tions similar to those proposed in connection with the "non-incrimina-
tion" privilege, above. First, the p rivilege could be overcome by a grant
of "use immunity" for the client with respect to future use, in any
criminal proceeding, of the information sought8 00 If the evidence could
neither be introduced against the client in any criminal proceeding, nor
be used to further a criminal investigation of the client, then the risk
that the lawyer would have to withdraw because of a conflict of interest
or because of her role as a witness would dissipate. Second, the privi-
lege would not apply to pre-existing unique materials and to materials
transferred to the attorney solely for purposes of concealment, although
all such evidence, if obtained by the prosecution, must be offered at
trial without any reference to the attorney as source.301 Third, the priv-
ilege would also be lost if the prosecutor can establish by clear and
convincing evidence that the representation is a sham, undertaken solely
for the purpose of rendering the attorney incompetent as a witness. Fi-
nally, the protection would be lost upon a proper showing" 2 that the
current representation was used to further a crime.
303
IV. CONCLUSION
The Justice Department's current extensive practice of subpoena-
29 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
299 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
300 See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
301 See State v. OlwelI, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 834, 394 P.2d 681, 684 (1964); supra
text accompanying note 293.
302 See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
303 See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
19881 1845
1846 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
ing attorneys to produce client information represents a sharp break
with the traditions and settled expectations on which our legal system is
based. The costs of this practice have ranged from disruption to total
destruction of the attorney-client relationship, with additional injuries
to the bar generally and the criminal defense bar in particular.
Current legal protections do not safeguard the attorney-client rela-
tionship adequately. Because of significant gaps in the coverage of ex-
isting attorney-client and work-product privileges, some discoverable
information in an attorney's possession can usually be obtained by a
prosecutor determined to make that attorney a witness. Faced with the
generally unwelcome prospect of compelling attorneys to testify against
their clients, some courts have attempted to close gaps in the area of
privilege, and other courts have used their supervisory power to regu-
late the use of attorney subpoenas. Overall, however, new safeguards
have not kept pace with the changing investigative and prosecutorial
strategies of the government and the growing need to protect the attor-
ney-client relationship.
This Article proposes four reforms to restore the balance between
the individual's right to counsel and the government's need for evidence.
These proposals include procedures and standards for judicial review
that would restrict the government's attempts to obtain client informa-
tion from the client's attorney, especially when the information would
incriminate the client or when the attorney is still representing the cli-
ent. If these procedures were employed in, for example, each of the
four hypothetical cases presented earlier3 0 4 the government would be
unable to obtain the information it requested, absent an extraordinary
showing.305
Our proposals would, in general, invert the current situation in
304 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
3'0 In Case Nos. 1 and 2, the client identity and fee information would be abso-
lutely privileged under the non-incrimination privilege and under the current represen-
tation privilege so long as the attorney continued to represent the clients, unless the
government undertook to guarantee "use immunity" for the testimony. If use immunity
were granted, the information could be obtained, upon a showing of need, to the extent
that it is not privileged by the attorney-client or work-product privileges.
In Case Nos. 3 and 4, the information is covered by the non-incrimination privi-
lege. Further, the information sought by the government was obtained by the lawyer in
a substantially related representation and thus, in each case, the lawyer cannot be sub-
poenaed while she continues to represent the client in the pending indictment. How-
ever, both of these privileges could be overcome if the government makes a convincing
showing that a crime was committed (on the basis of evidence other than testimony or
documents from the attorney and subject to defendant's rebuttal). Even under this cir-
cumstance, the government must make a compelling showing of present need. If the
need for the evidence could be deferred until after the attorney completes her represen-
tation of the defendant on the pending indictment, the subpoena would be disallowed.
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which the attorney's ability to avoid testifying against her client is the
exception. Our proposals are not inflexible, however, and they provide
the government discovery opportunities when the client is insulated
from harm, when unique, pre-existing materials are sought, when the
privileges are abused by sham relationships or transactions, or when
the representation has furthered the commission of a criminal offense.
In turn, when a client is not currently represented and the information
would not incriminate the client, the government could obtain otherwise
non-privileged information from the client's attorney by making a
showing of need.
Adoption of these proposals would restore greater reliability and
predictability to the confidentiality of attorney-client communications,
including information (such as client identity and fee information)
which is often treated by the courts as lying outside the scope of such
protection. If these four proposals become law, attorneys will be able to
give their clients broader assurance that the information acquired in the
course of their representation will remain confidential. Unfortunately,
under present law and current government practices, the attorney can-
not yet give her client such assurances.
While our proposals might be considered far-reaching, they are
certainly less so than the policy of regularly using attorneys as wit-
nesses against their clients. It is that policy which represents a bold
innovation in our legal system - one which the measures proposed
here seek to regulate.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A
U.S. Department of Justice
Attorney-Subpoena Guidelines
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL
§ 9-2.161(a) (1985)
Policy With Regard to the Issuance of Grand Jury or Trial Subpoenas
to Attorneys for Information Relating to the Representation of Clients.
Because of the potential effects upon an attorney-client relation-
ship that may result from the issuance of a subpoena to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client, it is important
that the Department exercise close control over the issuance of such
subpoenas. Therefore, the following guidelines shall be adhered to by
all members of the Department in any matter involving a grand jury or
trial subpoena:
A. In determining whether to issue a subpoena in any matter to an
attorney for information relating to the representation of a client, the
approach must be to strike the proper balance between the public's in-
terest in the fair administration of justice and effective law enforcement
and individual's right to the effective assistance of counsel.
B. All reasonable attempts shall be made to obtain information
from alternative sources before issuing a subpoena to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client, unless such efforts
would compromise a criminal investigation or prosecution or would im-
pair the ability to obtain such information from an attorney if such
attempts prove unsuccessful.
C. All reasonable attempts shall be made to voluntarily obtain in-
formation from an attorney before issuing a subpoena to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client, unless such efforts
would compromise a criminal investigation or prosecution or would im-
pair the ability to subpoena such information from the attorney if such
attempts prove unsuccessful.
D. No subpoena may be issued in any matter to an attorney for
information relating to the representation of a client without the ex-
press authorization of the Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal
Division.
E. In approving the issuance of a subpoena in any matter to an
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attorney for information relating to the representation of a client, the
Assistant Attorney General of the Criminal Division shall apply the
following principles:
(1) In a criminal investigation or prosecution, there must be reasona-
ble grounds to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and
that the information sought is reasonably needed for the successful com-
pletion of the investigation or prosecution. The subpoena must not be
used to obtain peripheral or speculative information;
(2) In a civil case, there must be reasonable grounds to believe that
the information sought is reasonably necessary to the successful comple-
tion of the litigation.
(3) All reasonable attempts to obtain the information from alternative
sources shall have proved to be unsuccessful;
(4) The reasonable need for the information must outweigh the po-
tential adverse effects upon the attorney-client relationship. In particu-
lar, the need for the information must outweigh the risk that the attor-
ney will be disqualified from representation of the client as a result of
having to testify against the client;
(5) Subpoenas shall be narrowly drawn and directed at material in-
formation regarding a limited subject matter and shall cover a reasona-
bly limited period of time; and
(6) The information sought shall not be protected by a valid claim of
privilege.
These guidelines on the issuance of grand jury or trial subpoenas
to attorneys for information relating to the representation of clients are
set forth solely for the purpose of internal Department of Justice guid-
ance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be relied upon to
create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by any
party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor do they place any limitations
on otherwise lawful investigative or litigative prerogatives of the De-
partment of Justice.
1988)
1850 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Appendix B
National Network for the Right to Counsel:
Attorney-Subpoena Proposal
LIMITATIONS ON LAWYER-CLIENT SUBPOENAS
Sec. 1. Definitions. As used in this rule:
a. A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, associa-
tion, or other organization or entity, public or private, who is rendered
professional legal service by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional legal service from the lawyer.
b. A "lawyer" is a person authorized or reasonably believed by
the client to be authorized to practice law in any state or territory of
the United States.
c. A "lawyer's representative" is a person employed to assist the
lawyer in the rendition of professional legal service.
d. A "lawyer-client subpoena" is a subpoena, or judicial or ad-
ministrative order, issued to a lawyer or to a lawyer's representative,
requiring the lawyer or the lawyer's representative to provide testi-
mony, documents or tangible objects concerning a former or current
client.
Sec. 2. No lawyer-client subpoena shall be issued in any proceeding
in which the government is a party, except upon a judicial determina-
tion made after an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing, held in ac-
cordance with due process, at which the client, as well as the proposed
recipient of the subpoena, has the right to participate, and at which the
government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that each of
the terms and conditions set forth in section 3 of this rule are met.
Sec. 3. In order for a lawyer-client subpoena to be issued, all of the
following terms and conditions must be met:
a. The lawyer-client subpoena lists with particularity the specific
testimony, document(s) or tangible object(s) sought to be provided;
b. There is probable cause to believe that each specific item of
testimony or tangible object sought to be provided is related to or is
evidence of past or present criminal activity;
c. Each specific item of testimony or document or tangible object
sought to be provided is necessary to the continued viability of a legiti-
mate government investigation or prosecution, and all alternative non-
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attorney sources for the item have been exhausted;
d. No specific item of testimony or document or tangible object
sought to be provided is protected from disclosure by any statutory,
common law or constitutional privilege of the lawyer or client; and
e. If the lawyer is currently representing the client in connection
with an ongoing government investigation or a judicial or administra-
tive proceeding in which the government is a party, the lawyer-client
subpoena does not seek:
i. testimony concerning information relating to, or learned
during the course of, professional legal service rendered to, or le-
gal consultation with, the client;
ii. testimony or document(s) or tangible object(s) relating to
fees and/or expenses paid to the lawyer or to the lawyer's repre-
sentative by, or on behalf of, the client for professional legal ser-
vice or consultation.
This section does not prevent the issuance of a subpoena for docu-
ment(s) transferred to a lawyer for a purpose other than seeking legal
advice from the lawyer.
Sec. 4. In the event that the government satisfies its burden of proving
all of the terms and conditions set forth in section 3, the lawyer-client
subpoena nonetheless shall not be issued if a judicial determination is
made that some other ground to quash the subpoena exists, provided
that such a determination shall be made in accordance with the same
procedures and standards applicable on a motion to quash a subpoena.
L
Sec. 5. The grant or denial of a lawyer-client subpoena pursuant to
this rule shall be appealable as a final order, provided that a judicial
determination made pursuant to section 4 shall be appealable only to
the extent that it would be appealable if made on a motion to quash a
subpoena.
19881
1852 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Appendix C
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION
(Adopted by ABA House of Delegates in February, 1986)
BE IT RESOLVED, That a prosecuting attorney shall not sub-
poena nor cause a subpoena to be issued to an attorney to a grand jury
without prior judicial approval in circumstances where the prosecutor
seeks to compel the attorney/witness to provide evidence concerning a
person who is represented by the attorney/witness; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That prior judicial approval
shall be withheld unless the court, in an ex parte hearing, finds:
1. the information sought is not protected from disclosure by the
attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine;
2. the evidence sought is relevant to an investigation within the
jurisdiction of the grand jury;
3. the purpose of the subpoena is not primarily to harass the
attorney/witness or his or her client; and
4. there is no other feasible alternative to obtain the information
sought.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the ex parte hearing
seeking judicial approval shall be conducted with consideration for the
need for the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. The hearing shall be
conducted by a judge of a court of general criminal jurisdiction, and,
wherever feasible, by the judge supervising the grand jury in question;
and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That no affirmative finding in
the ex parte proceeding shall have any evidentiary value in any subse-
quent adversary proceeding to determine the validity or enforcement of
the subpoena; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Asso-
ciation urges that these principles be implemented by state and federal





AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION RESOLUTION
(Adopted by ABA House of Delegates in February, 1988)
BE IT RESOLVED, That a prosecuting attorney shall not sub-
poena nor cause a subpoena to be issued to an attorney without prior
judicial approval after an opportunity for an adversarial proceeding in
circumstances where evidence obtained as a result of the attorney-client
relationship concerning a person who is or was represented by the at-
torney; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That prior judicial approval
shall be withheld unless the court finds, on reasonable notice to the
attorney and the client:
1. the information sought is not protected from disclosure by any ap-
plicable privilege;
2. the evidence sought is essential to the successful completion of an
ongoing investigation or prosecution and is not merely peripheral, cu-
mulative or speculative;
3. the subpoena lisis the information sought with particularity, is di-
rected at information regarding a limited subject matter and a reasona-
bly limited period of time and gives reasonable and timely notice;
4. the purpose of the subpoena is not to harass the attorney or his or
her client; and
5. the prosecutor has unsuccessfully made all reasonable attempts to
obtain the information sought from non-attorney sources and there is
no other feasible alternative to obtain the information.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That at the hearing, the prose-
cutor seeking to subpoena information as defined above, must submit to
the appropriate court an affidavit making a particularized showing of
the facts establishing all of the requirements specified above. The affi-
davit shall be disclosed to the attorney and the client. However, upon a
special showing of compelling need, the affidavit may be maintained as
an ex parte affidavit until such time as the need for secrecy is no longer
compelling; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That any hearing seeking ju-
dicial approval for a grand jury subpoena shall be conducted with con-
sideration for the need for secrecy; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, That the American Bar Asso-
ciation urges that these principles be implemented by state and federal
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authorities through appropriate means such as rules of court, statutes,
and case law.
